Cryptocurrency as a cybersecurity alarm
stakedy.com
stakedy.com
I suppose the balancing act here is in ensuring the Bitcoin amount is enticingly large enough to get an attacker to jump on it first?
It's a nice bonus, but if they're working with other people for high stakes payouts, a small amount of money like that isn't going to be worth it for them to move on. $10k is nothing when split between other people and when you can demand hundreds of thousands to millions otherwise.
But besides, in remote environment it is easier to be that guy who grabs the money and runs. $10k is $10k for a single person.
wow that is the craziest justification i have heard so far for sustaining a planet-eating, nightmare 'currency'
Regarding the Stakedy article, that is exactly what we do: BitTrap is a blockchain-based intrusion detection system that provides alarms when a system was compromised. We do so by granting hackers an economic incentive (bounty) in crypto to reveal their position within the organization's network and dissuade them to continue the attack therefore minimizing their dwell time in the system.
We calculate the right economic incentive by running tests in our Lab to replicate possible outcomes in diverse situations and we also protect pretty much any device you can think of (even offline devices) becoming a real Universal Intrusion Detection System.
As we don’t want to get pitchy here, we’ll just leave some reference links to let you find out more about us: www.bittrap.com
We have a few whitepapers and articles you may also find interesting: https://www.bittrap.com/resource/articles-whitepapers
Let us know if you’d like more info or detail. Thanks for the (indirect) mention :)
Jony BitTrap CEO
The cost of using bitcoin for compromise detection is much lower when you can just have one moderate value coin and then have a different key on each server.
You can have a wallet where a master key holder can spend from it at no additional cost than an ordinary single key wallet, but where any of thousands of detection wallets can also spend the coins but paying for 32*log2(wallets) additional weight in transaction fees, which is pretty modest for any realistic number of detection wallets... the resulting transaction will reveal which wallet was used to take the coins.
It's a relatively cost effective approach-- if you're not compromised you lose only the time value / volatility value of holding a modest amount of bitcoin. If you are compromised, you'll lose the coins but you gain a useful notification of the compromise.
> Two digital people can mate and produce a child inside of Celody.
> This process occurs through music - where the parents' data is compared and generates an infinite stream.
> If the humans listening to this stream like the music, they can have the digital people reproduce.
> The digital child then inherits a mix of data of their parents.
Way more interesting than the article.Articles from this site have been posted on here before, lots of commenters don't even notice.
e: Wow, stumbled on this:
> Once a post has been staked and is live, it is open to judgment. Every post has a binary agree/disagree (or like/dislike) set of buttons. If you agree with the post, you send tokens with the "agree" button. If you disagree, you send tokens after pressing the "disagree" button. Critically, the quantity of tokens sent matters. The more tokens, the more impact it has on the Stakedy algorithm. These tokens also act as a reward to the poster.
Sounds like web3 will be algorithmically provoking outrage even more effectively than web2!
Better to sit on the exploit and wait until you can break ECDSA too, run off with Satoshi's private key 8-).
So short BTC rather than invest in it, and then do it.
Besides, there are plenty of people who would tank BTC just for fun, or to prove its bad somehow, or just to annoy the Winklevoss twins...
Definitely more excitement in upsetting some major stakeholders, though.
I'm pretty sure ANY movement on that stash would lead to an amazing drop in price too.
even if you had the theoretical quantum computer with enough qubits to derive private keys, you would be better off just taking some people's coins or transactions so that people will victim blame them based on assuming they have poor OPSEC instead of tipping off that the system is compromised
In a windows network, I highly recommend using honey hashes: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/mod... that is if you don't have windows defender credential guard on.
My question for the OP is, what happens when acutal users start using the wallet? I wonder if these approaches work at small companies though. In large companies (50k+ endpoints and users) this would be an almost regular source of false positive alerts.
I keep an eye out for any new process connecting to a mining pool domain for example, there is always some guy somewhere runing a python trading bot or something.
And even if they are, they bait crypto needs to be valuable enough. If the attacker expects to extract $1 mil of value from the hack, you will not deter with a $10k crypto bounty.
you can either set-up your own honeypots or, if you want a turn-key solution there's great tools like https://canary.tools/
The attacker wouldn't lose money because they're using that wallet to pay the fees, so you'd be the only one paying the transaction fee. Also, if this became a standard, it's possible that attackers would find ways around it (it kind of becomes an arms race to see who can bribe miners the most).
If your wallet contains no ETH, but contains for example, USDC, then they have to transfer their own ETH in to make a transaction to extract the USDC. This would work in theory, but it's such a common way to scam/hack people already that most attackers would be able to sniff out the honeypot.
The typical scam is "leaking" the private key for a wallet that has, say, $30 of some valuable token in it (e.g. on reddit, discord, anywhere that less technical users congregate). When users import the key and realize they can transfer the token out, they only need to deposit some ETH to the wallet first to pay for gas fees. But when they do that, a script automatically sends the ETH somewhere else.
Personally I see this being a potentially valuable way to manage servers, and also pay a non-critical bug bounty to black-hats. Each server can have its own crypto wallet, and the amount you fund it with varies based on how critical it is. If a compromise of one system occurs, you know immediately where the compromise occurred based on the address.
The attacker gets a payday, and you get a lead on something you need to patch.
The hackers could operate a miner which privately adds that transaction every time it tries to solve a block, but broadcasts it only when they successfully got the block. It could be running for days before it succeeds, because there's probably no urgency. They can take all the fees, and it's difficult to frontrun because nobody knows the theft is happening until the block is already solved and it's almost too late.
What do you mean? The only outcome is that the company loses money due to giving it to miners.
Old situation: blackhats sticks around for weeks or even months, exfiltrate data, blackmail, install crypto miners, etc.
With crypto honeypot: blackhats take the crypto and leaves.
With rigged crypto honeypots that are actually not redeemable:
>on the hacker forums:
>Guy A: "I tried to take the bitcoins from Corp A's honeypot wallet, but they broadcasted a high fee transaction and beat me to it."
>Guy B: "Funny, same thing happened to me last week with Corp B's wallet."
>Guy A: "Guess it's back to the old blackmail method then."
Bottom line: I think we can guess which option a CEO would usually choose
Remember that this method works best when it's not obvious that it is a tripwire, and may be best of all when it acts as a bribe to a greedy individual within a group of hackers.
Even hear stories, people hack providers, to fix some things, constantly not fixed by official support.