Prior security seemed to focus entirely on attackers, and their agency, and what they could potentially do. But we also need to pay attention to what users can do in order to build a secure system. Requiring users to read domain name strings, potentially in Unicode, every time, and make sure they are correct, to prevent phishing, is a really bad design. Instead, have the website authenticate themselves to the user, automatically, and have the machine do the string comparisons.
Similarly, the distinction between user and password for a biometric doesn't make much sense in this case. It's neither. The user is identified by a different mechanism, the biometric is merely a way for the device to see that the user is there.
There are always lots of attack modes for biometrics, but they are convenient and good enough to capture nearly all common and practica attack modes. And a huge problem of the 90s and 2000s security thinking was focusing on the wrong attack modes for the internet age.