because the US did not face a formidable adversary in the past 75 years
in a war somewhat comparable with this one in terms of manpower and tech - the Korean War, the US had suffered heavy casualties and had only narrowly escaped a complete defeat
because the US did not face a formidable adversary in the past 75 years
in a war somewhat comparable with this one in terms of manpower and tech - the Korean War, the US had suffered heavy casualties and had only narrowly escaped a complete defeat
One would be that the US chooses its engagements. Even given that, Korea (1950--53, within your 75 year window), Vietnam, and the Yugoslav war (in which the US was not a major participant but did contribute to the no-fly zone) were reasonably significant, involving Chinese and Russian forces and arms. The Iraq conflicts were not highly symmetric, but did involve threats to US forces, which the US mitigated. On balance, the US seems to treat even highly asymmetric opponents with respect as concerns their ability to inflict harm and damage, and seeks to minimise that.
Another is that even where it faces a highly asymmetric adversary, there are:
- A long and formidible force build-up.
- A preliminary air-superiority campaign in which any possible defences are neutralised.
- A concerted effort to maintain superiority.
I'd say it's a bit from A, a bit from B. But the clear lessons are that the U.S. values, and achieves, total air superiority. In the present conflict in Ukraine, Russia did not, and has not.
Technology has also clearly moved on. The major development of the aughts was in IEDs and remote attacks. To an extent, the US applied countermeasures here again via air and intelligence superiority, with reconnaissance which both detected in advance and replayed after successful attacks the placement and entities engaged in IED emplacements.
I've had discussions elsewhere over the characteristics of Switchblade drones, in particular their one-way "kamikazi" modes. I see two principle advantages:
- A one-way mission should nearly double range, and increase defended area by the square of the range.
- A returning low-speed munition would tend to invite return-fire on the launch point.
Since Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost drones are carried into the field by individual troops, increased mass, decreased range, and greater vulnerability of the deploying troops would all be strongly negative characteristics. My counterypart in that discussion was not convinced, though I find the rationale fairly strong.
I also see drones primarily (and incredibly) useful for recon, but not for combat - we already have cruise missiles and guided artillery for that, and under wartime economy, they could be mass produced much cheaper than they are now
But the combat results do appear impressive, both on the video-watching public and on Russian invading forces and their leadership, for whom plans appear to have significantly changed.
because the US did not face a formidable
adversary in the past 75 years
Clearly not a peer to the US nor close to it, but Iraq's military in the Persian Gulf war was more formidable than many give it credit for.Those were not green troops. They had fought Iran for close to a decade, were well-equipped, and were fighting on their home terrain against a US force that had little to no modern desert warfare experience.
I don't think the US-led coalition's brilliant strategy and execution should be confused with a total lack of fighting prowess on Iraq's part.
South Korea and allied powers were significantly outmanned during the Korean War, and the idea that the US had any kind of decisive technology advantage in theatre is belied by the accounts of lack of US preparedness post WWII.
and the point I'm trying to make is that it is laughable to compare fighting a modern military to Iraq and Afghanistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.deploymen...
Russian forces in the 1st & 2nd Chechen wars (1994--6 and 1999--2009, respectively) were in the 70k -- 80k range.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chechen_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War
A force of 200,000 is a very considerable invasion force.
Yes, but Ukraine has 900k reservists and a reason to activate them all.
Russia, thus far, has hoped to avoid having to do a big manpower increase.
Much of Ukraine's equipment is Soviet era just like Russia's is. USSR was a direct belligerent in the Korean War, not just a supporter like NATO is.
Prior to the start of this conflict Russia had superior numbers and pounced before Ukraine mobilized.
Russia also has the massive advantage of being able to strike from their own and neighboring territories without retaliation.
Constant nuclear-whining is preventing NATO from performing air interventions like the USSR saw fit to do during the Korean and Vietnam war.
Too many differences in variables. Russia's incompetence alone does not make this comparable.
Is the Korean war comparable, or a non-significant adversary of the past 75 years?
(The Korean war began 72 years ago, and ended with an armistice 69 years ago.)
When the military is bogged down and draining the nations treasury and making the gov't look bad, the political decision is inevitable.
As for "draining the nations treasury", US military spending actually increased after the end of the Vietnam War.
It may not have been tanks on the ground, but that is small consolation for those blown to bits - even still today due to unexploded ordnance.
It also led to outsized inflation (which contributed to the out of control inflation in the early 80's, along with the increase in other military spending to 'fight the cold war') and cost an inflation adjusted $1 trln dollars.
The US wasn't broke, but it contributed to the giant inflation spike that then had to be tamped down with sky high fed fund rates. It wasn't without impact.
Over nine years, whereas the US spends nearly $1 trln dollars every year on the military now.
Politically there was no will to occupy North Vietnam and end up facing China directly.
> The limited goals entailed in American foreign policy and the military's goal of total victory were simply not reconcilable. The great conundrum had then become how to defeat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam.
Interestingly it has some analogs to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine https://time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-war-so...
China believed it would be a quick and easy conflict where they would blitz Hanoi. Instead they fought with outdated and ineffective tactics, failed to use their air forces properly, and could not make it that deep into north Vietnam before being stonewalled by the more experienced Vietnamese. In response China began brutalizing the countryside out of spite, burning crops, killing civilians on sight, booby-trapping civilian structures, demolishing factories, killing livestock.