Why the SEC Won’t Hunt Big Dogs
propublica.org
propublica.org
The hunt for the criminals is a waste of time. People were acting aggressive, not criminal--with notable exceptions that could happen in any era. In fact, finding scapegoats will make the problem worse. It leaves the system intact and fools everybody into believing the problem is fixed.
Credit and risk has always been a problem of information. In this era we have more tools than ever to manage them. However the rules require a major rethink to get the right information circulating.
Now, if you believe it is a systems problem, what's the solution? Here's one: Transparency. Not the SEC's version of quarterly accounting quibbles. Just tell me the the end-of-day positions of every "large" participant. 20 years ago that would be too much information to process. Now it would be no problem. Lots of little agencies could process the information.
The impact would be enormous. The informational advantages of large institutions and so-called speculators would simply disappear. Nobody would be able to grow to be too big to fail, simply because they would have a harder time trading. If you are starting to feel sorry for banks having to supply this type of formerly proprietary information, just remember, they have the corresponding information on you and you don't complain.
Suppose a hair dresser buys a house for $750k, the interest payments alone consume 50% of family income, clear title has not been established for the house, and the signed mortgage document is filed into a dumpster. Suppose hundreds of similar mortgages are piled together into a mortgage-backed security.
The criminals were rating that festering bond as AAA (highest rank) and stuffing it into pension funds. The rating fee was on the order of $500k, but the raters did not even pick a single private eye out of the phone book to verify that the house even exists, nor a CPA to see that if the paperwork exists.
The whole thing was a fraud from beginning to end. Thousands of people need to go to prison, and pay trillions in restitution.
> Just tell me the the end-of-day positions of every "large" participant.
Bernie Madoff Investments had stellar numbers. The whole point of a financial fraud is that the numbers are cooked.
Can you cite a specific example(s) of mortgages being approved for houses that didn't exist?
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04232010/profile.html
When an investment bank packages up securities to sell and doesn't communicate material information to potential buyers (e.g. "the bonds are junk"), that's fraud. People committing fraud as part of doing their jobs are criminals.
When an S&P manager tells one of his professional credit raters not to request information on the loans underlying the instruments he's supposed to rate, what would that be?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/the-two-docume...
Letting Wall St crash and burn means everybody in America's pension disappears - everybody over 65 is out on the street. Everybody who saved money has lost it. Nobody accepts cash anymore, after all if you put it in the bank it might dissapear. You are back to bartering chickens.
The market essentially is a herd animal. Everything goes up or down together, in aggregate. Since wisdom in the financial market is to diversify, ie, hold in aggregate, a well-chosen portfolio generally does about as well as the market in the long term.
So if Grandma had 100K in her diversified portfolio of low-risk investments and the market exploded 50%, she'd have 50K, which represents a major loss of financial capabilities.
Whether it is better to drop such people in the cold while things reset or whether it is better to keep the cushion going, I leave to another media form, as such discussions tend to be too inflammatory online.
This is most likely not the case. There are many ways the market can "explode 50%". One way is for each security to take a 50% haircut. Another is for the high risk securities to take a 100% haircut and the low risk to take a 0% haircut. Obviously real life lies somewhere in between.
However, it's not by any means obvious that the low risk, well diversified investors would take a particularly large haircut in a market crash. This is particularly true if they don't cash out immediately after the crash.
Andrew Ross Sorkin talks about this in "Too Big To Fail" (http://www.amazon.com/Too-Big-Fail-Washington-FinancialSyste...). When things were really bad in 2008, and people were wondering what investment bank was going to go next, there was very real fear that eventually the biggest, most stable banks such as Goldman Sachs would go under. After Goldman, the next institution wouldn't be a bank. It would be GE.
The fact that not only have there not been high-profile prosecutions of the executives who created the conditions under which their employees engaged in systematic fraud; but the USDOJ has been actively coercing state AG's into agreeing to a thoroughgoing amnesty that will absolve most of the major players of any criminal liability. And pray tell, why would these bankers be demanding immunity from prosecution if they were not fearful that a serious investigation into their behaviour would find them guilty of, at the very least, criminal negligence if not outright fraud?
And that, my friend, is the point where you have to accept that the system is in fact broken; and that the checks and balances have been short-circuited; that the system is out of control and that we are fiscal flotsam on the tide of events from here on out.
Was that not well understood beforehand? I'm Canadian, but our government will only certify certain investments. Everything else comes with the understanding that all of your money could be gone tomorrow. As such, we plan for such occasions. It is an expectation that an event like this will happen eventually.
That insurance fund would indeed have been wiped out, however, the government could have injected more money into it. This would have been the appropriate level for the bailout to take. Save the pension funds and FDIC insured savings, let all the large banks and brokerage houses go bust. The small business administration could also have provide some bridge loans for smaller companies stuck without capital.
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pension_Benefit_Guaranty_Corpor...
What are you talking about, where does the money go? Money doesn't just "disappear."
Now the Bank has $0, and owes you $100. You can no longer withdraw your money from the bank, it has "disappeared". The farmer has the $100, it still exists, but the Bank has lost it. Saying that it has "disappeared" is a way to shift the blame away from the Bank.
The joke is when you realise that the farmer isn't a farmer, he is an investment banker. And he got a $100 bonus. And he actually works for the Bank.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garn_-_St_Germain_Depository_In...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gramm-Leach-Bliley_Act
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commodity_Futures_Modernization...
This is exactly what one would expect. Each bailout increases the moral hazard involved in the banking system.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard
Heaven help us with the next bailout.
Who goes hunting for dogs? No one; rather, dogs accompany hunters, perhaps while in pursuit of big game.
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?i...
At what point do the claim "they are doing their best" and the claim "clearly they don't have the resources to do anything" collide and explode into burning rubble?
I can believe that there are many noble individuals in the Doj who are doing their best. But how can one not call a resource-less investigation a tooth-less investigation if you are talking about intentions of Doj itself?
Congress has the power of the purse, and can keep the executive branch on a very short lease if it chooses. Meantime, subjects of an investigation can often borrow a tactic from civil litigation and bury the other side (in this case, the DoJ) with heaps of irrelevant or incidental material that will be enormously time-consuming to sort through.
Partly because of Congressional funding decisions going back for years and partly because of inefficiency, government legal investigators are badly lacking in the technical department. Sadly, this state of affairs suits some people very well.
It is hard for me to believe that if Eric Holder and/or Barack Obama were loudly saying "Wall Street is getting away because you aren't giving us funding", things would not change.
... I think the "suits some people very well" part is most to the point. It is hard not to imagine that this group includes those at the highest ranks of government.
Edit to add reference: http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/ca...
No, I don't make this stuff up.
Securities litigation is slow because it is complex; additionally, there are sound economic reasons why it is often better to settle for the certainty of large fines than waste time and money on uncertain litigation. It's not as if scores of corporate officers went to prison following the crash of 1929 either. Bad policy often ends up as its own punishment.
More like bad (but probably legal, and probably profitable) decisions made in bad faith. Anyone with half a brain could see that housing prices would not continue increasing indefinitely. But all the incentives in the industry were to make loans that were likely to head into default.
A hot shot kid coming out of a C.S./engineering program wants to work at Google or Facebook or a startup, not the federal government. A kid coming out of an econ/math/finance program wants to work for a "big dog" at an investment bank or a PE fund, not some wimpy bureaucrat.
He looked at Madoff's returns, the strategy they claimed they were using and took "4 hours" at home to figure out that it was fraud.
Here is a choice section of Markopolos's testimony: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1A7LdW0Y_s
That said, I just can't see how they could ever attract or develop the financial minds required to keep up with wall street.
I was actually primarily referring to the non-financial side of the employment decision which I would argue is huge. That's why I said "they want to work for big dogs rather than wimpy bureaucrats" instead of pointing out that the SEC could never pay them as well as BMO or GS.
Setting aside whether you think this to be true the perception among undergrads headed into finance is that investment banks offer work environments which are high intensity, committed to excellence, meritocratic and so on. To them the idea of being involved in some sort of paper shuffling bureaucracy is really repulsive.
The truth is there are still lots of people who don't hear that their buddy got a job at GS and immediately think they are some sort of a scumbag.
I haven't responded to the comment below about the CIA but I think that rather than proving the point that its all about the SEC being underfunded it actually shows how culture/ perceived importance of the work/ mission/ impressing your friends etc etc can totally outweigh an organizations ability to pay when it comes to attracting talent (Wimpy bureaucrat certainly isn't the first thing that comes to my mind when someone says the CIA or the NSA). The CIA's entry level economic analyst positions top out at 90k which is where most entry level IB positions start, yet the CIA still manages to attract some of the United States' best and brightest econ/math/finance graduates.
What world would you rather live in? One in which a not so smart but rather well paid institutional investor puts money (your pension) in a scheme that apparently is a blatant fraught for anybody who cares to actually look at the numbers for more than a sec. Or one in which the rather smart but morally flexible investor saw through it and took a well educated guess how long it would hold up and be profitable?
No one ever thinks wimpy bureaucrat when they hear CIA or NSA. They think security clearance, report to the president etc. Thats definitely part of the reason why the CIA can pay relatively low starting salaries for economic and financial analysts (I checked) and still compete with the banks for high quality talent.
The short of it is that many of the people that work for the SEC and the Justice Department are themselves financial industry insiders who have no interest in pursuing their friends or ruining their professional futures.
As I heard it, that was the sarcastic end to a 'conversation' in which Taibbi persisted in ignoring any information that did not fit that narrative. The DoJ has put a string of financial industry people in jail for fraud but Taibbi never, ever tells his readers about those cases. TBW was one of the largest mortgage brokers in the country and the almost entire C-suite went to jail; the chairman got 30 years. Taibbi's sole comment on this was that he was 'the exception that proves the rule.' Complete bullshit. Matt Taibbi's schtick is to endlessly repeat that the system is broken that nobody cares so he can reap pageviews from the ignorant. You absolutely cannot rely on this guy for objective reporting.