Edit: I mean here it looks like that ripping off the front-panel and powering the solenoid will get you into the safe.
Edit: I mean here it looks like that ripping off the front-panel and powering the solenoid will get you into the safe.
Sadly this is an issue of market demand rather than poor engineering. Good security costs more and this is priced into the safe/lock ecosystem - if you want real security buy a commercial safe with a Group 1 lock. Sadly though this leaves consumers at risk who don't understand this. They buy a safe from a brand they recognize and they think they are in good shape. Meanwhile I get shunned on forums by actual safe techs by encouraging muggles to do their own research and buy higher quality commercial safes 2nd hand for less money.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SEHUqkbIjU
TL;DW Decision making should be on the secure side of the door, and communication should be encrypted.
An attacker who can intercept and replay the comms between the keypad and the controller, can probably also intercept and replay the signals from the physical buttons into the keypad's microchip. Or perhaps more likely, point a hidden camera at the keypad.