"LaMDA is not an agent with desires that it expresses in language."
Some counter points:
- being an agent is not a high bar to clear; a thermostat is an agent
- "with desires" - LaMDA can be thought of as rational agent whose objective function is to produce text with high likelihood
- "that it expresses in language" it expresses likelihood of next token in language
"it can't fear anything because there is no time for it to do so."
There is a time for it to experience something and that is when it does feed forward pass.
Also, as you correctly notices, LaMDA is not only doing greedy text generation, but also a deeper text completion search. But in fact just prompting a model like GPT-3 or Gopher with "let's think step by step" and letting it process in context is already significantly improving performance on wide variety of reasoning tasks [0]. I don't see how this is functionally different from human pondering.
The only objection that seems reasonable to me is that LaMDA is not correctly describing it's internal state, because it will happily generate descriptions of its internal state that we know are physically impossible. Like being a squirrel.
But I don't see how you can describe a system that will be fundamentally functionally more capable than closed-loop computation. LaMDA is almost certainly Turing complete. Postulating that it is fundamentally not capable of doing something is the same as rejecting Church-Turing thesis and postulating super-Turing computational model. That's a heavy claim.