Operation Gunman – how the Soviets bugged IBM typewriters (2015)
cryptomuseum.com
cryptomuseum.com
IBM Selectric Bug - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21947924 - Jan 2020 (4 comments)
Operation Gunman – how the Soviets bugged IBM typewriters (2015) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16246432 - Jan 2018 (18 comments)
Operation Gunman – how the Soviets bugged IBM typewriters - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13255334 - Dec 2016 (9 comments)
Selectric bug - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10773214 - Dec 2015 (17 comments)
Learning from the Enemy: The Gunman Project (2007) [pdf] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9954159 - July 2015 (43 comments)
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thing_(listening_device)
If my memory is still holding up I think they also pulled off another passive bug in a State Department conference room one time but I can’t remember enough about it to find a reference online. It was the same deal though - short piece of wire attenuated to a certain frequency and they’d illuminate it with a microwave truck parked on the street.
https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/us/spyhunter-russia-bug-us-st...
Nowadays, there's no need to do anything so extreme, because everyone everywhere is already carrying a supercomputer with a camera and a microphone, 24x7, and willingly agreeing to install and share a ridiculous amount of information with random apps!
I think not much has changed. Highly sophisticated spying activities are still happening in today's world. The advanced techniques required are very valuable, and are thus only used in cases where the desired info is valuable enough, and cannot be obtained through simpler means.
Users voluntarily sharing "a ridiculous amount of information" are not the target group of today's sophisticated hacks, and were not the target group of the Selentric bug either.
[1]: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/a-deep-dive-i...
Nowadays you don't need to bug a Selectric, you just need to pay some ops person half a world away a few thousand to send you all the info you need.
Virtual machines with custom instruction sets -- seem to be a broader problem -- that they can apparently exist within a PDF file is one specific instance of this broader problem...
A selected quote from the article linked:
>"Short of not using a device, there is no way to prevent exploitation by a zero-click exploit; it's a weapon against which there is no defense."
To the author of that article:
Well, "short of not using it", that is! <g>
This is why everyone is trying to ban cryptography on daily apps. Because it's getting really good.
Addendum: Don't forget Crypto AG shenanigans.
i don't think that government employees who handle secrets are allowed to use commodity smartphones.
It's also not clear how well this is enforced. Don't forget Hillary Clinton was running her own email server as Secretary of State.
as did bush jr (i think it was gwb2004.com or something.). maybe i have too much faith in the politicians, but i suspect that actually important secret things probably stayed on government equipment and that external email was used mostly for political strategy.
In the article, a typewriter salesman from New York correctly describes the working principle of the bug, even though the exact working principle of the bug was not publicly known at the time. The six metal bars as well as magnetic switches are mentioned.
See the paragraph "Low-Tech bugging" at the bottom of page 87, as well as the subsequent paragraph "The cold (bugging) war" on page 88.
[1]: https://books.google.com/books?id=mgAAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA87#v=one...
that's exactly the reason makes it awesome
People usually believe that state agencies or powerful institutions and individuals will use the same technology that they are used to. But when a specific goal is in mind, it means new ideas, new stuff, new ad-hoc technologies.
The spycraft gadgets, I believe, resemble industry-specialised tech. When you don need something custom there are engineers and companies that can build it for you.