The Dangers of Microsoft Pluton
gabrielsieben.tech
gabrielsieben.tech
* SMM has been part of x86 for decades. The Secured Core requirements around SMM actually reduce its power.
* The claimed requirement to remove the third party UEFI CA certificate from 2022 Secured Core PCs is entirely unrelated to Pluton (it's required regardless of whether Pluton is enabled or not, and even whether the CPU has Pluton or not)
* Most of the description of Pluton is actually a description of a TPM. You don't need DICE for remote attestation. TPMs are already a hardware keystore.
* System firmware is already being updated via Windows Update. The discussion about Pluton and Windows Update is around Pluton getting firmware updates that way (the existing story around firmware updates for TPMs is largely not good)
* Existing TPM-based remote attestation already includes the secure boot state
The short version: everything that the article is worried about being enabled by Pluton is already possible, and has been for years.
But there's a meaningful point here. Remote attestation can certainly be used to restrict access to resources in ways that are incompatible with general purpose computing, or which reduce user choice. Remote attestation can also be used to give end users confidence that their machine is in a good state without constraining what they do with it. As a technology, remote attestation can be used in both good and bad ways. We do need to keep track of whether anyone is threatening to use it in bad ways and react appropriately.
(But tbh remote attestation as an attack on general purpose computing isn't the really scary thing about widespread remote attestation. Remote attestation ties back to the TPM's endorsement key, an immutable cryptographic key certified by the TPM vendor at manufacturing time. The straightforward implementation of allowing arbitrary remote sites to trigger remote attestation would tie all of these accesses back to a single piece of hardware, and would be a privacy nightmare.)
everything that the article is worried about being enabled by Pluton is already possible, and has been for years.
There's a HUGE difference between "possible" and "very easy to deploy". https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29859106
That means in three years, every supported PC will have TPM 2.0. Within ~1 year, assuming that Intel and AMD fulfill what they've implied in the launch announcement, every new PC will also come with Pluton.
That's a lot easier to deploy to compared to having some PCs with TPM, others without, some out-of-date on TPM 1.1, some with unpatched firmware (like the 2017 Infineon bug), so forth.
Now... some say, what about non-Windows systems, like macOS and Chrome? Think bigger for a second - Cisco (as an example) is in the Trusted Computing Group that designed a lot of this stuff, and Cisco Meraki is deployed in so many businesses for Wi-Fi security its incredible. All Cisco Meraki has to do (for example, maybe its not Cisco) is make a connection app that uses Pluton/TPM on Windows, Secure Enclave/T2 on macOS/iOS with Apple DeviceCheck, and SafetyNet on ChromeOS/Android. And you are all done - you've successfully made sure every new system is almost certainly untampered with. You've locked the door. For any system that can't be verified, no problems sending them to the IT Help Desk to be manually registered with a private key and sign a disclaimer.
It wasn't possible before, but five years from now, it will be much easier. Every Windows PC will be on the same page, and all major systems will have consistent assertion frameworks. Now, is Pluton wholly responsible? No. Windows 11 plays a role. Pluton just makes it broader and stronger, and Pluton also provides a long-term strengthening as eventually the TPM 2.0-only level will be able to be cut off for just Pluton.
> The claimed requirement to remove the third party UEFI CA certificate from 2022 Secured Core PCs is entirely unrelated to Pluton (it's required regardless of whether Pluton is enabled or not, and even whether the CPU has Pluton or not)
Pluton is de-facto a Secured Core PC implementation, and Secure Core PCs are also making this change. Thus it effects both Pluton and Secured Core, but the new requirement does not effect non-Pluton and non-Secure-Core systems. Because Secured-Core PCs are currently niche and will no longer exist once Pluton is broadly adopted, Pluton will be the first appearance of this change for the vast majority of users.
If I'm selling a 12th Gen Intel system right now, I can keep the 3rd-party UEFI certificate enabled. If I am selling a 12th Gen Secure Core PC, then this year I must disable that certificate, but my non-Secured-Core PCs can again keep it open. When Pluton arrives, that door must be shut.
You can verify this with Microsoft's Secured Core PC documentation:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/dev...
> Most of the description of Pluton is actually a description of a TPM. You don't need DICE for remote attestation. TPMs are already a hardware keystore.
To an extent. The original TPM is very finicky as documented by the comments on this post and elsewhere - even changing a RAM stick could invalidate the TPM's assertion. For this reason, the TPM was very unideal for DRM due to it's all-or-nothing approach, which Microsoft Pluton does not make the mistake of repeating, allowing for much more granular security that makes it much more easily applied. The second reason why Pluton is much more dangerous is that the TPM could be easily virtualized or hacked over the bus rendering DRM use-cases quite broken, whereas Pluton supports neither weakness, making its DRM potential (again) much more potent. Finally, using DICE, unlike a TPM, the Pluton is explicitly designed to give a computer a permanent identity that can never be erased, which (again) TPM does not guarantee.
Useful HN comment explaining: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25193346
That's actually the big reason why the Remote Assertion is an important point here. The TPM version of it was almost unusable outside of very niche business applications and BitLocker, while with DICE, the Pluton is far more potent. (After all, if TPM worked fine on it's own, why does DICE even exist?)
I think the last point to further back this view I will also add is these comments from a Microsoft employee on the subject.
https://lobste.rs/s/fdguww/dangers_microsoft_pluton#c_tdlo1r
> System firmware is already being updated via Windows Update. The discussion about Pluton and Windows Update is around Pluton getting firmware updates that way (the existing story around firmware updates for TPMs is largely not good)
Microsoft themselves states in Pluton's announcement that Pluton will hardware-integrate with Windows Update for various system firmware, through their "chip-to-cloud" security initiative. To quote them:
"One of the other major security problems solved by Pluton is keeping the system firmware up to date across the entire PC ecosystem. Today customers receive updates to their security firmware from a variety of different sources than can be difficult to manage, resulting in widespread patching issues. Pluton provides a flexible, updateable platform for running firmware that implements end-to-end security functionality authored, maintained, and updated by Microsoft. Pluton for Windows computers will be integrated with the Windows Update process in the same way that the Azure Sphere Security Service connects to IoT devices."
This is a little frustratingly vague and thus part of the reason why Pluton requires some speculation. Judging by the reference to "different sources that are difficult to manage", it appears you don't update Pluton, Pluton updates you. Pluton has an active role in your system's security, whereas TPM was only passive.
No, it's not. You can deploy Pluton without having to implement the Secured Core PC spec.
> Microsoft Pluton does not make the mistake of repeating,
No, seriously, the only remote attestation supported by Pluton on x86 at present is literally this TPM-based remote attestation. There's no meaningful fragility here - remote attestation means you can look at the individual log events rather than just looking at the composite PCR values, and that lets you ignore the noise created by things like hardware configuration changes. I have helped build and deploy infrastructure that makes use of remote attestation to validate secure boot state.
> the TPM could be easily virtualized
No, because the EK certificate won't chain back to a trusted CA>
> hacked over the bus
True in some cases, but already mitigated on all systems that are using fTPMs (ie, most Windows 11 systems).
> the Pluton is explicitly designed to give a computer a permanent identity that can never be erased, which (again) TPM does not guarantee.
TPM does, in fact, guarantee that. The endorsement key is static over the lifetime of the TPM.
> why does DICE even exist
DICE provides a set of features that don't require the functionality of a full TPM. This allows you to implement things like device identity attestation in a standardised way that works for both hardware with a full TPM and also IoT devices where a TPM would be too expensive.
> Today customers receive updates to their security firmware from a variety of different sources
Look at the diagram immediately above that quote. They're talking about the firmware that runs on Pluton, not the firmware executed by the main CPU.
Again, you're raising a legitimate issue (remote attestation can be used for bad things), but you're burying it under a bunch of misconceptions and just flat out inaccuracies. I agree that we should be worried about widespread use of remote attestation, both from a "War on general purpose computing" perspective and a privacy perspective. But literally everything you're legitimately worried about happening could happen right now. Framing this as something that's tied to Pluton risks giving people the impression that they can avoid it by just not buying anything with Pluton, and that's simply untrue.
I may update the article to reflect this, I will look into that further. So far the few Pluton systems available all seem to also implement Secured Core, however, as more systems become available perhaps that will change...? I am OK with being wrong here and openly admit that there may be inaccuracies and speculation due to the limited public information and limited number of systems and configurations with Pluton so far.
I'm not quite at the point of agreement yet, mainly because your argument leaves Pluton's addition and functionality almost redundant and inexplicable. From your perspective, almost everything the Pluton is capable of is also possible with a TPM. However, this does not make sense to me, as why implement the Pluton if an fTPM is fully capable of everything the Pluton can do? Why can't an fTPM just be updated with CPU microcode which Windows Update already can handle? What is the point of SHACK then if TPM is fully capable of handling keys already? Why would Microsoft make a grand announcement about how this allows for "chip-to-cloud" security with Project Cerberus and all that, if nothing actually changes almost at all?
Also, can you explain how this checks out with Microsoft RIoT?
Honestly, that sounds pretty fantastic. I've been using 3rd party tools/extensions to do this sort of thing in corporate and government environments for years, but having the attestation go all the way down to the hardware level is a big value-add, especially with so much ransomware/spyware/extortion/espionage going on these days.
Can someone please explain to me how the author might see this level of security as a bad thing?
From the USA, we get news of banned book in some states. When I read that, my head goes back to my european history, and I reach the Godwin point very quickly.
Those kind of people will abuse such system to prevent things to be shared.
It will be used for putting DRM on everything and create a more and more closed web.
It will be used by corporations and govs to prevent wisthleblowers and journalists to do their job. Or to prevent employees to get evidences of mistreatments in case they need to sue.
Because if you look at it, it's basically just a system for information control. And bad actors love that.
And of course it will be "for security reasons".
Trusting people with a terrible track record to not abuse a massive power in the future, espacially one that can be scaled up with the push of a button once the infrastructure is in place, is not a good bet.
Books are not banned, just not used in the classroom anymore. While the reasons for it may be wrong, it's something that happens constantly all over the world. No one prevents children or adults to read those books at home. Banning books could mean that owning them is illegal and that just hasn't happened.
https://www.virginiamercury.com/2022/07/06/free-speech-group...
Just within the last century it was illegal to send a copy of Ulyesses or The Canturbury Tales through US mail.
Chip manufacturers could even decide that nothing good happens on open source operating systems, so you're now only allowed to run Mac or Windows operating systems.
The point is really that they're taking full ownership of the chips from you.
https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/news/2022/05/06/florida-ba...
If you're worried about book bannings in states like Florida, DeSantis is up for reelection in just over 3 months. Go volunteer or donate money to his opponent (probably Charlie Crist).
It reminds me of the good old "my password takes 2 billion years to crack, but my kneecaps only take a few seconds" metaphor about people in tech forgetting that physical coercion is, in fact, a possible attack vector for your IT security.
Enforcement is a different issue.
Yet, you probably don't want to give willingly a nuke to a dictator.
In the same way, giving this kind of power to people that have shown in the past to abuse information control is like banking on the wolf to behave in the hen this time.
> Go volunteer or donate money to his opponent (probably Charlie Crist).
I'm not in the US. I just read those crazy news, compare it to my grandfather stories, and worry.
By forcing the kernel to be untamperable, Microsoft can arbitrarily enforce ANY policy they choose on your PC. They could spy on every single piece of network communication. They could ban any given software from being able to run on Windows - maybe Chrome, maybe Steam, any competitor at all. They actually could easily enforce laws on banned content too - any given website, book, audio or video could be impossible to consume, and an attempt to try could be reported to Microsoft. They could stream the contents of your display and mic and camera at any time to anyone they choose. There is literally nothing they cannot do with complete control over the kernel. And since the kernel and Windows itself is closed source, there are ways to hide all of it so you would never even know.
Security is great but it also goes hand-in-hand with control and surveillance. Every capability to increase security also increases the amount of control those providing the security have.
Exactly this. As soon as governments (or lobbyists) discover that this level of control is available to them, they will introduce whatever remaining laws they need, banning E2E encrypted chat apps, or Tor, or bittorrent clients.
I suspect that, like civil asset forfeiture, or running commands on botnet-infected devices[0], these actions will have only the thinnest veneer of "due process" applied to them. After all, if your computer is running "illegal" software, why should the government wait for your permission before deleting that software, or even tell you that it had done it after the fact?
[0] https://uk.pcmag.com/security/139675/us-disrupts-cyclops-bli...
Particularly now that heterogeneous computing is making it big, video decoding can easily just be made not to work unless this tech stack okays it--regardless of the OS.
This chip could all out disable other operating systems if they don't provide the spyware telemetry that Microsoft requires.
IIRC, this was the reason Valve created SteamOS: they feared Microsoft would use their control over Windows so that the only viable software store on PCs would be Microsoft's own store.
Hopefully we get the digital markets act over here for similar protections
Wait a few years. Smaller companies won't even be allowed to order high end cpu's. You'll be at 100% mercy of these corporations.
If after 2 years they decide to brick your pc, they'll just do it. You think government will help you out here? Lol...
So the government will clearly help out here. And none of these companies has an incentives to stop sales to smaller companies, they make a lot of money with those.
Ah, that must be why we all have root access and can freely modify or install anything we want on every device we own! Oh, wait, we don't have those things and our non-PC systems are increasingly locked down and routinely do things against the wishes of the people who own them.
All this has already happened since 2008 when the app store came out.
But the devices were actually slowed down, so the danger is real.
The government is probably part of the driving factor in building this system.
The government probably doesn't want Wikileaks type material to be rendered. There are _so_ many ways the government likely wants to abuse this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AACS_encryption_key_controvers...
Could as well gouge out the eyes of everyone not having a read permission on said document. There are 1001 solution to solve such problems. And as a gigantic bonus it doesn't have to be bound to hardware! User permission management is much easier.
It's like your company giving you serious protecting gear to wear while doing your work on a nuclear reactor is a good thing. But having to wear such gear at home is not a popular choice, and should not be required.
You can choose not to wear that gear, but choosing to not use Windows is much more complicated, at least for most people.
Also, thank God for the Internet Archive.
Basically, this will make transparency even harder than it already is. That's a terrible danger for democracy at large. Stalin's wet dream.
/s
Outside of corporate IT, what if Microsoft uses this remote attestation to enforce binding non-corporate PCs to a Microsoft account. Some don't have a problem exposing everything to Microsoft's cloud, but Pluto sounds like it could be used to enforce this on a hardware level.
If computing devices without bondage to a cloud service are impossible, Windows has no more value proposition for me for personal computing. I'm going to stick with Apple, because at least Apple allows me to turn it all off, off seems to mean off on at least Apple iPhones/iPads (I don't have to check hundreds of weirdly named services, policy settings, scheduled tasks that are all on for some reason), and settings don't seem to randomly sneak on between updates.
News of Pluton and its security goals have been readily available since 2020 from reputable hardware sites like Anandtech, or directly from Microsoft themselves. There's nothing new or hidden or surprising about it unless you live to dream up Microsoft conspiracy theories.
Many other hardware manufacturers have similar security offerings including Intel and Apple. Microsoft is arguably late to the game here, given their only recent interest in PC hardware. OS integration isn't even new. Macs have been shipping with T1 and T2 chips for over five years. Has the sky fallen on that ecosystem?
At a past job, we used Entrust [0] and I'm aware of Virtru [1] as well.
Edit: I forgot about Sharepoint, which also sort-of fills the ACL document-sharing niche. (though I'm less certain about whether it uses encryption to enforce its access policies)
nothing. there's nothing you can do to stop that.
The only question is whether they will trust metal detectors to prevent whistleblowers from bringing in these devices, or if they will rely on strip searches and CCTV.
What if you government's tax service requires such proof? Or bank? I cannot count how many machines I booted on Linux to rescue a hard drive, or image it, or wipe it, or just to install linux on them. All those devices, boom, paperweight for regular personal use.
I hate it so much that Microsoft is alone in this. It's not because it's M$, it's because they're alone on it.
As a developer of a banking app, I do my best to avoid implementing this user-hostile crap, but not all developers are empowered to say "no" to this requirement and not all care. There is zero benefit to the user to block them from using your services, and I would argue the net benefit is negative to the service. Users aren't hacked via privilege escalation exploits, they are hacked by phishing, and they can be phished on a SafetyNet-compliant device just fine.
Thank you for being a smart banking app developer. There is so much bullshit in most of those apps that I consider them as "worst apps on my phone", but due to management incompetence rather than developer incompetence.
When those these restrictive practices were introduced with iOS and to a much lesser extent various Android distributions (not just phone, but other types of appliances), i was genuinely surprised about how quiet the same type of people are, who I thought protested out of principal.
Its the same pattern, like poltics, where people are just basically trying to sell or advocate for you to buy into or sell another product.
A legislative piece of paper (or many pieces of paper) have the power to reign in corporations far far beyond any technical solution or workaround.
And yes, that requires limiting (intellectual) property rights and regulating what certain contracts can enforce. Sometimes it's needed if you ask me
In my experience this sentiment is rejected primarily by many technical people because it feels like adding the human factor to a pristine world of logic. In reality it's humans all the way down and there is no reason to believe that Microsoft/Apple is a better steward than an elected body of representatives acting according to the rule of law
Of course, Microsoft would say it's not about DRM (at least right now), it's for "security." Which... its secure as Microsoft's servers are, to be sure.
Don't people listen when a guy like Pompeo speaks he has pretty much outlined the plan with his Clean Network Initiative, I wouldn't be surprised that within a decade CloudFlare and other US cloud services will be used as the great firewall of the western sphere.
Because if they don't add whatever garbage Microsoft orders them to include in their chips then Microsoft can simply require that shit for the next version of their OS to boot. They could even force an update on existing PCs to check for it. Nobody is going to buy a chip if having it means they can't run the OS that 99% of computers on the plant are using. If Intel dared to say no, MS could pretty much run them out of business.
Unless that latest chip is vastly superior to what we have today, almost nobody is going to care. Most people couldn't tell you which chip is in their computer right now. They don't even care what a processor is. They just want to be able to click on the little picture that makes facebook happen and they don't want to have to learn anything new to make that happen.
If every chip manufacturer refused, you're right that we'd be pretty safe, but the moment they can get just one chip manufacturer on board every OEM will buy those chips or go out of business. Intel was "evil inside" decades ago for a reason, so we knew how this was going to play out.
Because the music/movie industry benefits from DRM and made agreements with the software and hardware industry.
Also NSA and the military complex benefit enormously from having control over hardware around the world.
But to me, this all looks like MS building a house of cards again. If I am writing a rootkit or other malware why can I not use this to make sure only the compromised devices secure processor can read the contents of memory or does defender get a pass?! A defender/analyst won't also be able to dump ram with volatility or a custom driver to analyze the malware/implant? No microsoft solution would prevent a user from downloading and running an executable entirely so malicious code would run, but can it now hide from security solutions? What part of HVCI am I missing?
As far as the rest of it, it will break legitimate use cases for users so I don't expect it to be a default anytime soon. I hate the remote attestation stuff but my hope is it will either fizzle out or regulations will be put in place for enabling user control of the secure computing private key for personally owned devices because code you can't introspect or keys you can't manage should not exist on a device you own (not license).
But I am personally glad to see hardware-level key stores show up on all CPUs. Maybe this is already a thing and I'm being duped by Apple for thinking it's good, but it feels good to me.
You don't need that. Streaming is already crippled on Linux. Hell, Netflix won't even stream full quality on Chrome!
> https://help.netflix.com/en/node/13444
4K Ultra HD on a computer
Netflix is available in Ultra HD on Windows and Mac computers with:
Microsoft Edge for Windows
Windows app for Windows 10 and Windows 11
Safari for MacOS 11.0 or laterIt's a nice demonstration how vendors won't bother to improve if the user has no choice.
- no, I don't need protections for the side channel, I never asked for them
- no, I don't need a unique identifier, who is the demented person who asked you for it
- no, I am not going to glitch the power supply, and even if I did it means I am interested in doing it and wish it worked instead I was prevented from doing it
- no, I don't care at all about having a hw store for certificates, which are ephemeral and dropped from above anyway so what am I supposed to trust?
- and so on
"not secure by design" nowadays comes close to being a coveted feature
Before you say, "well, they're the government, why don't they just compromise the secure boot CA"; the problem is that cryptographic signatures create evidence. If someone finds your boot sector malware you don't want it to be attributable - but signatures from an already-trusted entity create exactly the kind of paper trail you'd rather avoid. If Microsoft signs a boot sector virus, then it's obviously a US government cyberweapon, and any companies that find it in their systems will start suing. In this particular context, secure boot is a policy of "no execution without attribution".
[0] Which nowadays can even be done in a browser. Modern browsers actually have to have throttling and CPU usage limits because of this.
Gee I wonder why. /s Such statements are tedious to say the least, preventions have been implemented, obviously it curtails such abuse, obviously that reduces frequency.
> the whole TPM module isn't really needed in my opinion
It's nice that you have no key material that would need to be kept strictly on the device, but a lot of users actually do. We don't want people's Webauthn tokens carried away, we don't want Bitlocker keys stolen, most certainly we do not want biometric authentication data stolen. Maybe you have reduced that risk to near zero, but that's not the case for the vast majority of users.
The frequency dropped even before TPM was deployed on most machines and I guess most systems still haven't it enabled today. Reason for that is that there are simply more direct and profitable ways to get system access, see most applications of ransomware for example.
> It's nice that you have no key material
You can use many different types of authenticators. If you use Windows Hello you need TPM and they try to hinder you adding alternative means without TPM being activated. But that is a different story and solely on Microsoft. No need to falsely or passive aggressively suggest that a system would be insecure without these specific means.
People fought against that and actually won, 23 years ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10106870
Unfortunately, that may have been the only victory, as they slowly started introducing a lot of other stuff silently under the guise of "security".
"not secure by design" nowadays comes close to being a coveted feature
Absolutely. As the saying goes, "insecurity is freedom".
At that same time, Microsoft started using your HDD serial as an identifier. Nowadays there are unique identifiers in most of your hardware, including the north bridge of your motherboard and the TPM that windows now requires.
Also, mobile devices got all kinds of unique identifiers from day 0.
Are you talking about brown-out detection circuits, or is there something else?
I absolutely don’t want my internet connected pet cam to be accessed remotely (outside the set of companies i’ve decided to trust, namely the manufacturer.)
Protection against hardware tempering is less good and probably mostly anti-consumer. The most legitimate cases I’ve heard:
- Protection from (some) supply chain attacks
- Leasing models. Where you acquire the item for less than it’s hardware cost and pay over time.
But honestly I’m not convinced of either.
Disclosure: I worked on Azure Sphere, the first place Pluton was developed outside Xbox.
Edit: I’ve read the whole article now. These scenarios are really bad and really realistic. Pluton is bad.
> "not secure by design" nowadays comes close to being a coveted feature
That's a huge market opportunity. I would buy "insecure" products over secure ones every time.
This one makes no sense. Wouldn't 99.9% of power supply glitches be some sort of accident, and something that the end user probably doesn't want?
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I think Microsoft feels threatened at this point about Linux becoming more popular on PCs; what with hardware like the Steam Deck. Can't have Linux dominate the PC platform if you forcefully bind all hardware to the Windows ecosystem. Imagine if back in the day Microsoft used their dominance to block out all competing software on PCs but their own.
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I can see a dystopian future where Government can enforce code/file signing with technologies like this (DRM), so that you can never again have an open computing platform; you could only ever use code or view files approved by the State, and if you try to write code or create content, it won't work period unless it is first approved by the State. (such as with an AI scanning tool to detect and block "wrong-think" or "dangerous functionality" (i.e. dissent or otherwise that threatens the powers that be))
I also look forward to the potential of open technologies like what RISC-V appears to enable. It's not all bad for sure.
Pluto (Greek: Πλούτων Plouton, "giver of wealth", Pluton in French and German) the most common name for the classical ruler of the underworld. Plouton was one of several euphemistic names for Hades, described in the Iliad as the god most hateful to mortals. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluto_(mythology)
Pun intended?
However, for private users these are dark capabilities.
As far as scripts for it, this thread has some sage advice:
https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/n3v0s5/disable_win...
The tools to disable telemetry and bloat:
https://github.com/irmatade/sharpapp https://www.oo-software.com/fr/shutup10 https://github.com/Sycnex/Windows10Debloater
MSFT doc on what all telemetry is gathered, and what is considered "required" telemetry (although they give you enough info to block it at the router):
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/configure-w...
I do like Win10 as an OS. On the whole I'd say the Satya era of MSFT is a mixed bag, but better on the whole than it was before.
Why can't hardware vendors embrace standards-based open platforms like Global Platform [1].
[Edit] Google is also pushing Android Ready SE Alliance [2].
[1] https://globalplatform.org/
[2] https://security.googleblog.com/2021/03/announcing-android-r...
This has little to to with security. It's about having more control over the user.
Kind of feels like Microsoft can’t win here. Everything is free and unprotected and their OS is a security joke, or they harden and get accused of DRM and monopolizing.
The libre computing movement got lazy. We got used to care about free software and just accept free-riding on non-free hardware because "hardware too hard" and frankly we got it easy with x86 CPU and PC manufacturers being generally friendly, actively or passively, to free software and actually benefiting from industry concentration. The less attractive proprietary CPUs and other chips get, the greater chance a small but lively open ecosystem develops?
Otherwise you can be assured that there will be backdoors.
microsoft is smart enough to realize that NSA tinfoil types already do not trust them, and likely will never trust them (which, if you are that worried about security, why are you on windows anyway? NSAKEY?)
the predominant share of windows machines are sold to businesses and enterprises who DO want to lock down at a hardware level.
it's way too easy to steal a windows machine and wipe it clean. you can't do that with DEP-enrolled macs because of the TPM they already have, which is a strange misalignment when Windows' core market (enterprise) really cares about this kind of security.
apple has every reason to care about DRM more than microsoft, but the TPM advent on mac was mostly a welcomed one as I recall. perhaps that is because apple has taken a strong and public stance towards user privacy. but they have to: it is consumers who are buying their devices, and consumers rightly want a device that works for them.
microsoft is not in that position, or at least, is not with windows, from an economic standpoint. similarly, they are mostly selling to enterprises and business and governments for this product line, and those customers rightly want a device that is verifiably secure.
if you're worried about security for your personal use, buy a mac, because they've made their bottom line and your privacy intertwined. or, buy a linux box and purity check it down to the circuits. you have already decided against convenience in your trade-off equation by your a priori decision to care about this in the first place.
What I do not want in my next PC is more DRM and adtech spying on us.
Microsoft has already tried to monopolize the PC consumer market before. And back then the risks were tiny compared to what is at stake now.
https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-courts-findings-f...
If you can imagine that, then imagine that every human is given a number which is equivalent to (or even more significant than) their name, and that name/number appears in certificates which are signed by the name/number of a certificate authority's key. By accepting the signature, you have to accept an EULA that takes an hour to read, so no one does, and it changes every month anyway, with future changes automatically binding you.
Does that sound like a world where people are free?
But of course, that begs the question of whether language is defined by how people use it. :)
Using "begging the question" to mean something as obscure and unintuitive (as in, it's basically an idiom that must be explained first) as "your question originates from circular logic" is a waste of prime dictionary space.
This term should mean "there is a question that is so blindingly obvious regarding the situation at hand, that it simply begs to be asked" - so, more or less what everyone who didn't have the term explained to them, thinks it's supposed to mean.
Don't throw away your current hardware when you "upgrade". You, or others, may need it or parts of it in the future.
If you can't, it goes without saying that that is unacceptable
Personally I think its very likely MS will eventually push to strongarm OEMs into locking secure boot to be enabled. All it will take is another round of "security improvements" and the public eats it up. The market would then fragment into laptops that can only run Windows and maybe more expensive laptops that allow you to disable secure boot. If the number of people who actually care enough to vote with spending a few extra hundred $ remains as low as it always has, over a decade it will drive open laptops to become wildly overpriced and eventually cease to exist.
The usual rebuttal is "Well, yeah, things are fine NOW, but they're moving the chess pieces into place to do these things LATER". Yawn. I have heard this for 20+ years. See you in another 20...
Let's say I'm a healthcare provider, and I'm about to send your medical data to a third party vendor. Wouldn't you prefer that your data only be able to be decrypted by a computer can prove to the world it booted a clean OS image with all the latest security patches installed?
If the vendor wants to install some self-built OS that they trust on their computer and not update it for 5 years, that's their business, but I may not want to trust their computer to have access to my data.
Remote attestation gives more control to the owners of data to dictate how that data is processed on third-party machines (or even their own machines that may have been compromised). This is useful for more than just DRM.
If there were only dystopic uses of this technology, its development wouldn't be able to go on internally. They are specifically taking this path so they always have plenty of good reasons to pursue their agenda.
Especially when attestation can be used by websites etc. We'll need to have another computer at the side for accessing them.
The video does a good job of the original threat model for this technology and how it works on Xbox.
well shit, time to switch careers.
Anyone who calls something secure without publishing the spec is just selling you a bridge.
A big chunk (I don't know the real number, but it's closer to 50% than 10%) of customer vm's on Azure are running Linux.
All this to say, MSFT is highly invested in the Linux ecosystem. They would be shooting themselves in the foot to try and kill it off at this point.
Manufacturers sell Linux workstations designed for power users and developers. UEFI/TPM, and now Pluton won't be a stumbling block for that as it hasn't been so far.
Dell is the biggest seller of pre-installed Linux desktop machines, and they are all billed as Workstations for power users or developers. Their home machines only have as an option Windows or ChromeOS. (Count that as Linux if you like, but I wouldn't...)
Why? Being more price competitive by bundling a free or cheap OS is not worth it in scaling up their support for a new OS. That's your stumbling block to better Linux desktop adoption, in my opinion.
Causing issues with remote attestation are probably more a side effect of just not caring about other OS's, rather than some sinister plot to sink Linux on the desktop.
This means to take anything written in that article with a grain of salt.
"DRM will be unusable outside Windows" is already the case.
"Documents can only be opened by authorised users" sounds like a dream come true.
"You can't boot Linux by default" is annoying, but hardly a deal breaker. Statistically, almost nobody runs Linux on their devices. Valve could make a change in the Linux landscape if they actually get SteamOS off the ground (third time's the charm, right?) but so far SteamOS 3 is only meant to be used by their own hardware.
It's been decades since I last heard about powerful Windows rootkits because you can't just swap out the bootloader anymore. You could try it and risk a non booting victim system, but you're not extracting data or injecting ads into the kernel that way. Malware hasn't gone away (partially because Microsoft doesn't want to break old, signed, vulnerable device drivers that are used to bypass signature requirements and gain kernel access) but it's harder to gain good persistence now.
I get it, I want to run Linux on these devices as well. All of this stuff should be easy enough to disable if you're the owner of the device. However, your freedom to use your device however you want doesn't imply that others have to put up with your choices. If I choose to only accept Microsoft Panopticon Validated Devices onto my network, that's my business, no matter how foolish it might be. Distributing my software as a .exe isn't some kind of violation of your constitutional right to run OpenBSD, it's a business choice.
Personally, I'd love to see a similar system provide a hardware root of trust for Linux as well. Qubes being able to verify every single step of the boot process and securely loading the system's (several) security keys would be a great security benefit. Hell, I'd even like to see the option to only run signed software on my machine to ensure the executables haven't been tampered with, either signed by the distro maintainers or by myself during the install process, but Linux doesn't have such features or configuration accessible.
As long as it's possible to disable this stuff or to configure it for your own, personal key set, I'm all for this stuff. I want the freedom to secure my (Linux or Windows) system in hardware, as long as you have the freedom to turn it all off if you disagree. I don't buy Microsoft hardware specifically because I can't disable or configure that crap, despite their excellent pen support and fancy designs, and I think others should do the same. That's my personal choice, though.
Remote attestation is the true enemy of your freedom. The power of the authoritarian corporatocracy to force you to use only the (entire) systems they control. It's worth reading https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html again just to see how prescient Stallman was.
These people won't respect you until you start taking their money. Become one of their techno-corporate overloads. Demonstrate how you're controlling/profiting off them, why it's bad. Maybe then they'll start listening. Or not. At least you'll have made a nice profit.
Think about how many devices in a typical users home are incompatible for business reasons - for example that Chromecast that refuses to play Amazon prime movies. Or the iPhone charger cable that won't fit into an android. Users just live with it.
"My weird laptop doesn't support the school WiFi" is the same.
People have become aware and angry that tech monopolies are exploitative. The winning strategy will involve focusing this fuzzy, ambient anger at a concrete target.
Once Pluton outs itself as an exercise in naked monopolistic power covered by a fig leaf of security -- and it will, as all hustles must eventually involve monetization -- the bad optics will be our opportunity to act. Any strategy on our side that involves putting down TikTok is doomed to failure, but if we put the bad optics in front of people, make the connection, and get them to briefly agree "yeeah, f** the monopolies! F** Pluton!" then a political solution becomes possible. Not easy, but possible.
It's a pity that this dialog has to be so reactive and simplistic, but communication at scale cannot function any other way.
I think it’s also worth asking why he didn’t have more impact despite pretty clearly seeing this problem. Part of the answer has to be resource disparities but I don’t think it’s just that - Linux didn’t really capitalize at all on Microsoft’s lost decade, and much of the innovation in security has happened on other platforms. I think there’s also some kind of blind spot in the open source community where a lot of people see this as something other people need, not them personally.
I've been saying this ad nauseum forever and I'm not the only one.
A related problem is that the OSS world is mostly tech enthusiasts. It's like having car people design cars. They'd be full of special switches and options and stuff that car people want. Car people don't understand that most people hate cars. What they like is mobility. Same goes for computers. Most people hate computers. They just like what computers let them do: communication, making content, getting their work done, etc.
The FSF was strongly against secure boot, then inexplicably started seeming to be in favour of it.
Connect the dots yourself.
RA is a technology that has its fair use, and can be desired for other systems, like in Linux. With a pure RA system your services can decide to trust or not those devices on your network that can be compromised, and report to other devices that there is something suspicious.
As anything, this can be used properly to increase the security of your edge architecture, or wrongly to limit the users actions.
Let me put another example. With RA I should be able to authorize validated systems in my R&D VPN. If you are using your own laptop with the company certificate, and the verifier tag the systems as "unknown" or "unhealthy", it will not allow the access to the internal network, but sure you can still use your laptop for anything else. This, IMHO, is a fair use of this technology.
https://boingboing.net/2011/12/27/the-coming-war-on-general-...
https://github.com/jwise/28c3-doctorow/blob/master/transcrip...
Don't know enough about the subject to tell if his "attempts to control general computation will converge on rootkits" prediction has held up.
If you play video games, you probably have a couple of neat kernel rootkits installed as "anti cheat".
A lot of remote proctoring stuff for exams are looking a lot like rootkits too.
EDR/XDR is also just rootkits. For security. The only thing that can stop a bad guy with a rootkit is a good guy with a rootkit, after all.
DEF CON 23 - Cory Doctorow - Fighting Back in the War on General Purpose Computers
I get the issue with Pluton but TPM is only a dedicated and certified secure key and random number generator that does a better job than CPUs doing it in software, and it's also a secure enclave for storing your encryption keys. Would you rather store the keys in memory where they can be easily grabbed by malicious apps like Mimikatz? Macs had the same feature for years in the T2 chip.
It's the exact system that enables wireless payment and other strong security features on your phone.
So having TPM on PCs and using it for its interested purpose is a boon for everyone's security so I don't see the issue, just FUD.
So in worst case, if your attestation server is very strict, any new binary installed on your machine will prevent it from booting or satisfying the attestation. This is the main concern that TPM enables.
Sure, there are theoretical attacks on memory, but they are far less relevant for security than the penalties I have to accept with TPM being widely established.
Not that there aren't different means, but TPM also creates unique hashes of your system which only reinforces the problems around fingerprinting.
> It's the exact system that enables wireless payment and other strong security features on your phone.
Phones suck as computing devices on every conceivable metric and are heavily locked down devices. And it is not true that you need a TPM chip to create secure transfers. I constantly do business transaction on my PC just fine.
2015: Governments recognize the importance of TPM 2.0 through ISO adoption https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2015/06/29/governmen...
2022: Microsoft Can Kiss My A* | Do You Own Your PC? [Smart App Control] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lv5xHfZnk4s&t=163s
The Trojan Platform Module (TPM)
HN has been consistently contrarian. That’s about all that you can say without quickly becoming mistaken.
Sure, you can sell yourself and make good money with software on some proprietary app store with proprietary tools. You are a freelance employee of the company providing that infrastructure at that point.
It is short-sighted, lazy and stupid in my opinion. There is merit for such security mechanism, especially for cloud applications, but it should be crystal clear that there are secondary motivations here. And that the security argument often falls short if you take a good look at current threats.
Keep in mind that now many of the people who post on HN earn a lot of money by working a company for which it is part of the business model to track users and collect data about them (officially for advertisement purposes).
You really wanna be scared? Go look at the multiple comments on the EU DMA announcement complaining that having a sideloading option is just a ploy for malware vendors to get into their iPhones. Or that someone else being able to sideload or jailbreak somehow hurts their security. These are coming from actual HN users!
Technology is a tool. What is true however is that under the current way how the economy is structured remote attestation weakens freedoms of individuals mostly.
If Facebook was under remote attestation that private information was only used in limited and specific ways and even the NSA can not get to them without breaking the remote attestation, that would be a good thing. If firmware was under remote attestation we would have to worry a lot less about backdoors and the Diesel scandal would have never happened.
Remote attestation would prevent a firmware written by first party and passed certification processes WHAT?
I'm definitely not on the "ban all crypto" side, but I see why the governments are in support of that, and for the longest time, strong crypto was (and still is?) classified as a munition; it's very powerful.
"Validity" for a device can mean many things (latest patches, is running anti-virus software, among other things).
A general user probably doesn't need to attest to these things. I would argue that anyone trying to access a corporate or some other organization's network SHOULD be required to attest to these things given the cyber threat landscape. The caveat: those same entities should provide or heavily subsidize the platforms they require (work computers). It's their IP at risk. I'm not so naive to think they would actually do this with BYOD initiatives, unfortunately.
For personal users on personal devices, I agree this might go too far (but some principles like MFA are best practices).
In order to deal with it, I had to create a subnet with a router, use an old laptop to do the verification, and then the whole subnet was added to the allow-list.
Updating the Upton Sinclair quote without the gender bias; it’s difficult getting a person to understand something when their investment portfolio valuation depends on them not understanding it.
Who are they if they’re not what they are now?
When you all stop posting on corporate forums and working their jobs, shopping their stores, I’ll take you all sincerely and seriously.
A secure operating system means nothing if the hardware itself cannot be secured, and the case for a new, trusted, transparent manufacturer of Intel-compatible CPUs and hardware in general grows stronger.
Though I get the feeling we're missing the forest in the trees. Smartphones with proprietary basebands have been here for more than a decade or so. It's not only Intel-compatible we need, it would really take legislation to turn all these things more transparent or controllable.
Separating the groups of those who have a good anti cheat system enabled (such as this) and those who don’t is a good compromise for everybody. I think more reasonable companies such as Valve will go that way.
Given that remote attestation already had deleterious effects for user freedoms on smartphones and tablets (meaning, choose between banking apps and any deviation from the factory ROM), Pluton should be seen as a danger.
If you want a general purpose computer get a laptop.
Most likely one sold by Linux OEMs, like Tuxedo and System76.
That device is likely to be a smartphone because everything is slowly moving in the direction of requiring one.
If I need to spend extra money to get an additional "freedom device" and can't afford it, I just won't have one and will miss out on the good stuff.
And I am pretty sure it's a darn good idea and well thought off and executed.
I cannot see why this is a bad idea besides the usual cargo cults claiming corporate distrust.
Heck we trusted Intel for decades and no one asked what Apple put in their silicon, because its Apple and Steve was so trustworthy.
Not anymore.