The concept of remote attestation isn't somehow safer if it works perfectly, and it isn't clear to me that this is actually impossible to build (within an acceptable and specified liability constraint) as opposed to merely exceedingly difficult. I do relish the schadenfreude, though ;P.
> Of course, I'd rather not see remote attestation happen...
Interestingly, the CEO of MobileCoin told me earlier this year that they were "going deeper on discussions with [you] to design a fully open source enclave specifically for [their] use case" (which, for anyone who doesn't know much about this, currently relies on remote attestation and encrypted RAM from Intel SGX to allow mobile devices to offload privacy-sensitive computations and database lookups to their server). I wrote a long letter to you a few days later in the hope of (after verifying with you whether that was even true or not) convincing you to stop, but then decided I should probably try to talk to Kyle and/or Cory first on my way to you (and even later ended up deciding I was stressed out about too many things at the time to deal with it)... does this mean you actually aren't, and we are all safe? ;P (I guess it could be the case that this special design somehow doesn't involve any form of remote attestation--as while my core issue with their product is their reliance on such, I went back through the entire argument and I didn't use that term with THEM--in which case I'm very curious how that could actually work.)