For untrusted multitenant workloads in 2022, for arbitrary code and without a language-level sandbox, a shared-kernel workload isolation system might be malpractice. Again: you can easily rattle off the LPEs that would have broken a Linux shared-kernel scheme (of any realistic sort) over the last couple years.
Someone else dunked on you for a Joyent bug from a bunch of years ago. I didn't. Security researchers were dunking on shared-kernel isolation even back then, but it was a much harder decision back when the only alternative was expensive, memory-unsafe legacy hypervisors, and I would have had a hard time weighing guest escape vs kernel LPE back then too.
But this time and the last time we bounced off each other on this, we weren't talking about 2015; we're talking about today, when there are multiple memory-safe hypervisor options. I don't think it's an open question anymore.
I also don't understand how you can coherently argue that people should have "religion about Rust", but also put their faith in C-language OS kernels any more than they have to.
Further, I don't understand how Meltdown helps your argument at all here, since both isolation strategies are susceptible. Memory safety also doesn't protect you from control-plane SSRF vulnerabilities, but you can immediately see why "control-plane SSRF vulnerabilities mean memory-safety is overrated" is a bogus argument.