TFA argues that digitizing one self inevitably leads to two copies, and the digital one is not real.
Let’s take a step back and start by replacing/simulating one neuron digitally. Is this a new you? I doubt TFA would argue so. Now replace 3,000 neurons every second over the course of a year and now your entire brain has been digitized. At which point did you stop being you?
The options are, 1) every second you are a new you, with or without digital replacement, 2) every second you are the same you with or without digital replacement 3) every second you are a new you with digital replacement but the same you if you don’t digitally replace. 4) some arbitrary % that feels right like 50%.
Option 3 hinges on a special differentiation between digital and chemical computation, which is at odds with fundamental properties of Turing Machines. Option 4 is as hand-wavey as it gets. Options 1+2 while they seem very different, ultimately can be treated as functional equivalents with slight philosophical differences.
There are real debates to be had over the morality of mind uploading and the very real risks of doing so, and many great sci-fi short stories covering this topic. Unfortunately, this article is too caught up on its hot take to make room for a proper consideration beyond its knee-jerk reaction.