Saying "our understanding of the world is incomplete because it has no explanation for qualia" is a classic, fallacious god of the gaps argument.
In fact we do have the beginnings of viable neuroscientific theories of consciousness, including qualia [1], thus showing that the claims of a hard problem were just the same old smoke and mirrors we've seen time and time again in claims to human specialness, just like with vitalism.
[1] https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119
> and you are saying that our understanding of the world implies that magic doesn’t exist and so I must be mistaken about the magic of my legs and probably their existence as well.
Nah, our only disagreement is over the magic. I don't deny the perceptions of qualia, simply their special, "ineffable", "experiential" character that you implicitly conclude they must have. That's the magic that doesn't fit into our body of knowledge and that's the only "hard problem" of consciousness, a problem that doesn't really exist because it's based on erroneous assumptions, as described in the paper above.
Just like placing a pencil in a glass of water gives the illusion that the water has broken the pencil, so your introspective perceptions trick you into erroneous conclusions about your awareness.