The recommendation that a browser is safer seems pretty silly though. As far as I can tell no web browser uses secure credential storage.
The recommendation that a browser is safer seems pretty silly though. As far as I can tell no web browser uses secure credential storage.
I was skeptical/curious how Windows's Credential Manager could have gotten around that, but Stackexchange says this (https://security.stackexchange.com/a/120001/76848):
> The Windows Credential Manager is anything but secure. It's "secure" at the user account level, which means that any process that the user ever runs and the user themselves must necessarily be trusted in order to call this system "secure" with a straight face.
So this should be about as secure as Chrome or Firefox's storage. A small layer of obfuscation to deter the least motivated script kiddies, but nothing that changes the nature of the problem. If you store secrets under your user account, then programs running under your user account can also read them back.
Accessing a secret in a file does not necessarily. It could be stored on a network share, included in a backup or archive or an attacker could confuse a program into handing them the file. Especially that used to be a very common attack against browsers.
And even if there was such a secure storage location, any program running as my user can read the token out of /proc/<teams PID>/mem; or it can ptrace(2) Teams and extract the token from the communication with the credential storage API...
Though I haven't checked if the dialog is run in a secure context, like for example the UAC dialog is. And I don't know if the dialog contains any information identifying the processing asking.
If the dialog is just run in the normal context, or doesn't inform the user who wants to decrypt the data, it's not that useful for thwarting an attack I suppose.
[1]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/dpapi/ns-...