Personally, part of the motivation for creating this was to find a middle ground between the most-secure hardware keys and the least-secure password options for authentication. I would argue that requiring users to have hardware is one of the main reasons we only see YubiKeys as a second factor, even though they benefits outside of being based in hardware (namely the lack of phishable passwords).
I think the main reduction in security is just that the virtual 2FA device is "cloneable" vs a hardware FIDO2 token where IIRC you can't extract the internal secret. So you're getting TOTP levels of 2FA (which also uses a cloneable initialization secret) thru a FIDO2-ish UX which seems like a reasonable thing to want.
I doubt most people would be suspicious if their system prompted them to touch their key, they touched it, the software kept waiting, so they touch it again and it works this time.