The most important is making sure the system works as intended. The code is a way to accomplish that. There are other ways to accomplish that, which frequently will include things like changes to the circuit, changes to the mechanical design, changes to specifications, operating requirements, silicon, or how the user interacts with the system in order to make sure it's working correctly.
That the code was incorrectly specced was the bug, and there it matters whether it was written by an unpaid intern, a $9 engineer, or a senior engineer who has enough system knowledge to know what the ramifications of the system interacting this way are, or allowing marketing to make it an optional fault light, or permitting only one sensor to be used as its input.
While the ultimate failure is a management one, one of the ways that management failed is they clearly didn't get the proper system-level architecture squared away.
Now, if you're reading a sensor and blindly trusting what it says, that can be a problem. And there is where it becomes important that someone with experience writes this. They understand what it means, they know the things that can go wrong.
Sending a story to India that says 'implement autopilot AOA sensor change', then that is exactly what the devs there will do.
Don't forget that the culture in India is different than here. There's no pushback. There's no asking questions. You need to be extremely explicit, and ask and ask and ask to make sure they feel comfortable asking the questions they have to you, someone they see as the one in charge.
Especially when the code is directly responsible for a physical system.
In my opinion the 737MAX needs a distinct type certification. This would dramatically raise costs, so it is covered up with software. FAA and regulators in other countries don't care. This management and regulator problem is enabled by all off the passengers who pay for seats on this plane.
I don't care if Boeing decided "this revision" of the 737 Max is safe. I insist on only flying in airplanes that the pilots were trained to fly on, without a compatibility layer between the pilots' training and the airframe characteristics.
The crime of the 737Max was that the MCAS fucking shit into the wind and introduced an unbelievably dumb stochastic failure mode (every X seconds MCAS adjusted the stabilizer), and the pilots had no idea what's doing it.
I don't fly often, but I go further. I just don't fly Boeing unless it's a 747.
747 || Airbus || Embraer
My airline of choice is American. I can see what a particular route is flying prior to purchasing tickets. There are enough Airbus aircraft in their fleet for me to pull this off.
But it highlights a general policy of outsourcing to the lowest bidder. This is generally a symptom of badly managed company placing spreadsheet profits above everything and seeing product development and Engineering as a cost center, which given the current Boeing situation, is quite telling.