Are you concerned with countries forcefully removing entries? Because there are a lot of other country TLDs where you can add your entries if you want.
With DNSSEC it is still vulnerable, but only to the kinds that you will know you are being censored, so you can try to get it from another country or another channel.
If your ISP denies DNSSEC for you, you already know you are being attacked, and can get it through some other channel. DoH is a cool channel, just make sure it has DNSSEC.
The only way around this is for local systems to do their own recursive resolution, which isn't the default configuration on any OS or distribution that I'm aware of.
What is it with DNSSEC that people have to pollute discussions saying that stupid stuff that isn't DNSSEC isn't secure?
The reason I'm describing local stub resolvers that check the dnssec bit of their upstream recursive resolver is because that's how DNSSEC is implemented in every OS/distro I'm aware of. So that configuration is what actually matters when we talk about users being protected (or not) by DNSSEC.
Are you really making FUD about it, by claiming unrelated logical fallacies in a non-boolean discussion? How does a "no true Scotsman" even applies to something that has a published standard?
I know you don't like it, yet, I have never seen any proposal that brings you the assurances DNSSEC brings. AFAIK, your favorites all wither solve different problems (relevant problems, yes, but not the same) or have strictly lower assurances (AKA, they are subject to the exact same flaws, and are either worse or not better of for each one of them).
DNSSEC defines stub resolvers, both validating and non-validating. Validating stub resolvers do their own supplemental recursive lookups to confirm DNSSEC validation. Non-validating stub resolvers do not: they strictly determine DNSSEC trust by checking for the "ad" header bit in the response from their upstream recursive resolver.
Every operating system, Linux distribution, and application that I'm aware of defaults to having a non-validating stub resolver (if it enables DNSSEC validation at all). This renders DNSSEC validation as performed by the overwhelming majority of systems vulnerable to the risk we're flagging here.
Probably I should figure out a way to have my pfsense box though dynamically generate the blocked IP's based on one of these dynamically updated lists...