If Russia dropped a tactical nuke, the U.S. would have to retaliate with one as well to make it clear that we are willing to. Letting them doubt our deterrence capability would be even more risky, and they know that.
If Russia dropped a tactical nuke, the U.S. would have to retaliate with one as well to make it clear that we are willing to. Letting them doubt our deterrence capability would be even more risky, and they know that.
>If Russia dropped a tactical nuke, the U.S. would have to retaliate with one as well to make it clear that we are willing to.
There is no reason that we must retaliate against Russia for a tactical nuke used in Ukraine. This in no way appears to undermine our willingness to defend NATO territories against such a strike.
What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S., is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world. You may like this principle, but Russia may not. They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have. They may see anything less as signaling permanent subjugation to U.S. interests. I personally have no interest in risking WW3 just to force Russia to signal subjugation to U.S. interests.
But that's the thing: nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to provide a strategic advantage in a conventional war of conquest, or they would be used. Russia using a nuke in a war on conquest would set a terrible precedent that cannot be allowed to stand. If they can do it with Ukraine, they can do it with Moldova, and then they can do it with any other country they choose to attack. If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore.
I don't think NATO can afford not to retaliate in some manner. How, I don't know, but doing nothing will effectively reward the offensive use of nuclear weapons, which means it will happen more often.
I don't know what this means other than we will fight a nuclear war to prevent other states from using the threat of nuclear weapons to secure their interests. But this is just unintelligible to me.
> If they have no retaliation to fear, they have no reason to hold back anymore.
We can demonstrate, and have, a massive increased cost to such incursions. But some nations may choose to pay that cost some of the time if they calculate the benefit is sufficient. The only way to prevent this is nuclear war. It is absolutely not worth it to maintain the stability of the current border configuration.
I don't really know either. There's definitely a point where nuclear escalation is going to require a nuclear response, but if a non-nuclear response is possible and proportional while still stopping Russia's ability to deploy nuclear weapons, that would of course be preferable.
There's a good reason why nobody wanted to escalate to nuclear war during the Cold War: you put the opposition in the position of either having to accept one-sided nuclear aggression, or go to full nuclear war. Both are terrible.
Think it; US won't directly attack Russia mainland, neither Russia will attack US mainland. But EU continental territories will probably be fair game for NATO.
So if a nuclear war begins nukes will only be deployed inside EU countries, that will probably lead a NATO disband and / or some countries with nukes or even conventional kinetic weaponry, just starting to directly attack Russia somehow, without US "ok".
You can't predict at this point how it is going to be played, but almost certainly, EU elites won't be happy knowing / discovering their land / cities / territories are going to be - nuclearly - taken to tabula rasa once again, and that would lead to decisions.
> Think it; US won't directly attack Russia mainland
You might ask yourself some questions:
(1) Why is having multiple independent nuclear powers as members an important part of NATO’s nuclear posture.
(2) Why is the forward deployment of US troops and nuclear weapons (some slated for delivery by host-nation forces under nuclear sharing agreements) also an import part of NATO’s posture?
(3) Why is the involvement of non-nuclear members of NATO in NATO nuclear planning an important part of NATO’s nuclear posture?
NATO—including the US—isn’t going to nuke itself (most of the EU also being in NATO or in close security arrangements with it) and not Russia in response to Russia using nukes against the EU.
I really wonder why you'd possibly think that. NATO dwindles when it seems unnecessary, but as we've already seen, nothing unites NATO like a common enemy does.
Keep in mind that NATO has spent its entire existence preparing for a possible war with Russia. The moment Russia starts throwing nukes, it will get nuked by NATO. It's the very thing the NATO nuclear doctrine is designed around: retaliation if Russia ever initiates a nuclear war.
The Budapest Memorandum suggests otherwise.
There is—security of the Eastern flank of NATO—though it doesn’t require a nuclear response.
> What this idea does, that Russia cannot use a tactical nuke in Ukraine because of the principle of a necessary retaliation by the U.S.
That’s not the principle. The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Direct NATO response has not been withheld short of further escalation by Russia as a matter of right or because Russia has committed insufficient provocation (on either aggression, humanitarian risk, or regional security risk calculus, Russia has far exceeded that which led to NATO intervention against Serbia or Libya) but out of desire to reserve responsive options in the event of further escalation.
> is negate the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering Russia at the mercy of U.S. interests around the world.
The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place thus rendering those powers at the mercy of Russian aggressiom around the world.
> You may like this principle, but Russia may not.
Global concern for what the current Russian regime likes is not particularly high right now, nor should it be.
> They may be motivated to assert their interests in Ukraine using the only remaining tools they have.
That is, indeed, a danger of a regime ewuipped with WMD of any kind facing conventional defeat and without the perception of its own domestic political strength to just take the L. But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons, there needs to be a clear expectation—and demonstrated follow through should someone decide ro challenge it—that using sich weapons to rescue failing aggression will only magnify the scope of failure.
The whole idea of "security of the Eastern flank of NATO" goes out the window when NATO engages in direct conflict with Russia. Your response is self-defeating.
>The principle is that Russia cannot prosecute an unprovoked war of aggression, in which it commits an appalling array of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
That's great for a tweet, but it doesn't actually outline NATO's policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating. Moral indignation should not be the driver of foreign policy.
>The idea that other nuclear powers cannot respond militarily to aggressive use of nukes by Russia negates the strategic advantage of having nukes in the first place
No, the idea is that a nuclear power inserting itself into an engagement between two parties while expecting the other party not to escalate to nuclear capabilities is undermining the strategic value of nuclear deterrence. The U.S. sitting out an engagement it was not involved in does nothing to undermine nuclear deterrence.
>But unless the world is prepared to allow itself to be forced into abject surrender to any aggressor willing to wave around nonconventional weapons
This is patently false and extremely dangerous, as I've already argued in a sibling comment.
No, actually, the whole reason collective self-defense and regional is a thing is that once someone is attacked, not fighting the aggressor can be worse for your own security than fighting them. THere’s a reason NATO Article 4 exists alongside Article 5 and has led to NATO action more than Article 5 has.
> That’s great for a tweet, but it doesn’t actually outline NATO’s policy towards Russia. If the goal is NATO security, our continued escalation of the proxy war is self-defeating.
No, the whole reason for NATO qua NATO support for Ukraine is that Russian aggression in the region is a regional security threat. Checking that aggression is by far the most important current security concern of NATO.
And what are the limits to this support? At some point, the support for Ukraine creates a greater security threat to NATO than no support. Escalating the proxy war to the point where Russia's only options are to nuke or retreat is a total failure of protecting regional security. Escalating even further to direct warfare with Russia is just to dissolve any idea of NATO security. There is no rational policy here, only policy driven by moral indignation.
So your trying to tell me, letting Ukraine force Russia out of its territories and showing them and the world that they aren’t the military ““super power”” everyone thought is _bad_ for regional security?.
What is your solution? To let Russia annex whatever territories it wants?.
This is just nonsensical. Offer an argument, and I will be happy to engage with it.
>What is your solution? To let Russia annex whatever territories it wants?.
In a comment upthread I have specified exactly how we should respond to avoid escalating to a nuclear war while also deterring future aggressive actions. Feel free to engage intelligently with those points.
> This is just nonsensical. Offer an argument, and I will be happy to engage with it.
Since you didn't link it yourself I can only assume that this is it.
> This isn't obviously true. Different regions will be valued differently by Russia in terms of control. It is clear that Ukraine is of supreme importance to Putin in terms of geography and cultural ties. If we raise the cost of victory in Ukraine to the point where that cost is higher than the anticipated benefit of occupying the next state, it is possible to prevent any further expansion. I believe we are well past that point in Ukraine. The assumption that any victory in Ukraine for Putin will inevitably result in further expansive attempts is a convenient narrative but doesn't hold up to scrutiny.
It appears your plan is to sacrifice Ukraine to Russia in hopes he doesn't do it again, this is a plan that is bound to fail as the world learnt with Hitler and the Sudetenland.
The only thing that will stop Russia having its colonial ambitions is to defeat them in such a thorough and direct way that they never think of doing it again as it would risk destabilising their country.
This is what is starting to happen in Ukraine, and what should continue to happen. The only way to stop this is force, appeasement never works.
This does not represent engaging intelligently with my argument.
Let's cut the crap. Is it your opinion that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange?
Is it your plan or not?.
> Let's cut the crap. Is it your opinion that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange?
No one is suggesting this because it doesn’t need to happen and is very unlikely to escalate to this.
Even if Russia uses a tactical nuke in Ukraine I don’t think the response from NATO would be nuclear because it doesn’t need to be. NATO is more then capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine in a short period of time with conventional weapons given the state of the Russian armed forces.
No, your disingenuous characterization does not accurately describe my offered policy.
>No one is suggesting this because it doesn’t need to happen and is very unlikely to escalate to this.
So your policy is to leave the ball in Russia's court whether we end up in a nuclear exchange, based on the belief that Russia will ultimately back down? And you think this is a wise policy?
>NATO is more then capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine in a short period of time with conventional weapons given the state of the Russian armed forces.
How can you be sure Russia will not respond with nuclear weapons to a direct kinetic response from NATO? Or a continuing and escalating response designed to push Russia out of Ukraine?
Then what is your policy? Your policy says to make it expensive for Russia to annex further territory.
But Russia has already annexed territory in Ukraine, what happens to that?. Can you directly tell me what you want to happen in Ukraine?, does Ukraine get to keep all its borders?.
> So your policy is to leave the ball in Russia's court whether we end up in a nuclear exchange, based on the belief that Russia will ultimately back down? And you think this is a wise policy?
It’s better then appeasement which is your policy. We cannot let Russia do what it wants or it will continue to annex territory from countries. For evidence of this just see.
- Moldova
- Georgia
- Chechnya
- Ukraine (2014)
> How can you be sure Russia will not respond with nuclear weapons to a direct kinetic response from NATO? Or a continuing and escalating response designed to push Russia out of Ukraine?
How can you be sure that Russia will?. Hell at this rate there’s a decent chance that Russias tactical nuke just wouldn’t work, which would be hilarious but also not a point I’d like to get.
Yes, expensive such that they will determine the cost is greater than the expected benefit. Every semi-rational agent responds to incentives, even Putin.
Yes, Ukraine will lose territory under my policy. How much remains to be seen. It turns out we don't get to unilaterally dictate how nuclear powers execute their foreign policy, not without risking a nuclear exchange.
>We cannot let Russia do what it wants or it will continue to annex territory from countries.
So your policy literally is that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange. Why do the hawks refuse to acknowledge the logical conclusion of their policy? Why not just own it?
> For evidence of this just see Moldova - Georgia - Chechnya - Ukraine (2014)
This isn't evidence that NATO demonstrating a massively increased cost to expansionist policy will not prevent further expansion. What the evidence shows is that no or lukewarm response to expansion, in conjunction with continued NATO expansion or interference, results in further Russian expansion. We haven't actually tried anything else.
Except they have learnt from Ukraine that if they threaten to use tactical nukes, people fold like a house of cards under your policy and Russia can get whatever it wants by holding the world hostage again.
> Yes, Ukraine will lose territory under my policy. How much remains to be seen. It turns out we don't get to unilaterally dictate how nuclear powers execute their foreign policy, not without risking a nuclear exchange.
So your dictating that Ukraine must lose a war, Russia gets everything it wants in hopes of teaching Russia what lesson again? that it can get its way as long as its threatens to use nukes?. What is to stop Russia doing exactly what they are doing now again?.
> So your policy literally is that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange.
My policy is to support Ukraine with any weapons that are not escalatory (ie dont given Ukraine its nukes back) and to provide Ukraine with the intelligence and support that it needs to push Russia out of its borders.
> Why do the hawks refuse to acknowledge the logical conclusion of their policy? Why not just own it?
Why do you refuse to acknowledge that your policy just allows Russia to continue doing whatever it wants as long as it threatens nukes, all your policy does is train Russia that nukes makes everyone fold like a cheap cardboard box.
> This isn't evidence that NATO demonstrating a massively increased cost to expansionist policy will not prevent further expansion. What the evidence shows is that no or lukewarm response to expansion, in conjunction with continued NATO expansion or interference, results in further Russian expansion. We haven't actually tried anything else.
What are these costs that you are suggesting that don't go straight out the window when Russia threatens another country with tactical nukes if they don't back down?.
No, they haven't. Let's not fall back into the dishonest takes after we made so much progress.
>What is to stop Russia doing exactly what they are doing now again?.
To repeat for the millionth time, the extreme cost that we impose on them for adventurism. They will not be willing to pay the cost they paid in Ukraine for fucking Moldova, for example.
>Why do you refuse to acknowledge that your policy just allows Russia to continue doing whatever it wants as long as it threatens nukes
Because it obviously doesn't to any honest interlocutor. I'm not sure what your deal is.
>My policy is to support Ukraine with any weapons that are not escalatory (ie dont given Ukraine its nukes back) and to provide Ukraine with the intelligence and support that it needs to push Russia out of its borders.
It's interesting to note the contrast between your actual policy proposal and the bombast of your rhetoric:
>The only thing that will stop Russia having its colonial ambitions is to defeat them in such a thorough and direct way that they never think of doing it again as it would risk destabilising their country.
It turns out you can't surely achieve the outcome of your rhetoric by adhering to the constraints of your policy. So which one gives first? What outcome are you willing to live with in reality, stripped of the rhetoric and cheerleading?
The only progress here is that you keep responding without any real answers.
What have exactly has Russia learnt if they get _exactly_ what they want when they threaten the world with nukes?. Can you actually answer the question instead of deflecting?.
> To repeat for the millionth time, the extreme cost that we impose on them for adventurism. They will not be willing to pay the cost they paid in Ukraine for fucking Moldova, for example.
Why cant this extreme cost be laid on them right now, so that they leave Ukraine, why is it that you are willing to throw Ukraine to the wolves so easily?.
> Because it obviously doesn't to any honest interlocutor. I'm not sure what your deal is.
The only bad faith participants here are you, you refuse to even explain any of your points or what these magical 'costs' are.
Your only point is that we must let Russia do whatever they want to Ukraine, and then hope for the best that they don't continue.
Your policy didn't work for Hitler and won't work for Russia.
> It turns out you can't surely achieve the outcome of your rhetoric by adhering to the constraints of your policy. So which one gives first? What outcome are you willing to live with in reality, stripped of the rhetoric and cheerleading?
Ukraine is completely capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine, they are in fact doing it right now.
One of the Russian ""annexed"" cities fell mere hours after the ceremony in Russia, nothing happened.
What's the state of their economy again? What's the state of their military readiness? How many lives have been lost? How much wealth have the oligarchs had frozen? This is the COST. I don't know why you insist on playing dumb.
>Why cant this extreme cost be laid on them right now, so that they leave Ukraine
Because they are likely willing to pay that cost to secure Ukraine, whereas they likely will not be willing to pay a similar cost for Moldova.
>Your policy didn't work for Hitler and won't work for Russia.
This facile Hitler comparison is going to lead us straight into WW3.
>Ukraine is completely capable of pushing Russia out of Ukraine, they are in fact doing it right now.
We will see when Russia's "partial" mobilization is complete. We'll see when Russia continues to escalate their use of weaponry.
Also notice how you didn't answer my question. It's the same with all you guys, you refuse to state explicitly where your lines are and what cost you're willing to pay.
Russias mobilisation has already started, mobilised soldiers have already made it to the front and have had enough time (~1 week) to be captured as POWs.
This is literally all Russia has.
If you want to show the gains the Russian conscripts have made I’d be happy to look at the evidence.
But it appears to me after mobilisation that Russia has started being pushed back to their own borders at a incredible rate.
Unless you expect the conscripts to do better then the professional soldiers how does Russia have anything more to give?.
So far the most of the "COST" you're talking about has been covered by EU oil exports. Your "COST" is a missed opportunity. Not great, not terrible.
> whereas they likely will not be willing to pay
"Likely". That's reassuring.
> I don't know why you insist on playing dumb.
Conveniently your theory is that Russia costs are just on the line of winning in Ukraine, but not pushing forward. Same theory has been applied to every single Russia expansion, and it hasn't worked yet. But this time it's going to work, right?
You presented absolutely no evidence that supports your theory, and yet you act incredibly condescending. It's just "trust me guys, this time the costs are high enough for Russia to stop. But only after they conquer Ukraine". Who's playing dumb here?
At this point there's plenty of evidence that Russia actions are not rational, they are ideological.
Is it your opinion that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange?
If your answer is "no" then you are tacitly accepting a possible scenario where Ukraine loses territory and we let it happen.
If your response is something along the lines of "it won't come to that":
It turns out you can't surely achieve the outcome of your rhetoric by adhering to the constraints of your policy. So which one gives first? What outcome are you willing to live with in reality, stripped of the rhetoric and cheerleading? Ukraine losing some territory or a direct engagement with Russia with a significant likelihood of nuclear war?
If you're unwilling to do a worst-case analysis of your proposed policy, then it is clear you're an unserious interlocutor and only engaged in propaganda and cheerleading.
You're presenting a false dichotomy: either Russia wins, or Russia launches their nukes. Coincidentally same points are being made by Russian propaganda.
My opinion is that you prevent nuclear war by showing strength. Not by helping Ukraine fight, but by ensuring Ukraine wins. If Putin is willing to use nukes now, he would be way more willing to do it 10 years later, when he's at the death's door. Or, Putin aside, Russians would be way more willing, because NATO made them pay the "high cost" and they want revenge more than ever.
> If you're unwilling to do a worst-case analysis of your proposed policy
Naive worst-case analysis for nuclear powers is exactly what opens up infinite opportunity for blackmail.
Here, I can do one for your theory. Let's say Russia wins in Ukraine but pays a very high cost. Given they can no longer advance with their regular army, they launch nukes at EU. Because there are "secret labs developing bioweapons" in Poland. Or because russian people (the ones that ran from mobilization) are being discriminated in EU. Or those mobilization refugees decide to form their own state and separate from Finland. Or for any other fake reason.
Or, they declare Alaska purchase illegitimate and demand US to give it back. If US refuses, they launch nukes at US for stealing their territory.
Sounds crazy, right? But not so crazy when a dictator learns he's dying from cancer and decides to take his enemies with him to the grave.
No, I did not present a false dichotomy. "Up to and including" is not a dichotomy, it's a gradient of escalation. Seems pretty clear.
>My opinion is that you prevent nuclear war by showing strength. Not by helping Ukraine fight, but by ensuring Ukraine wins. If Putin is willing to use nukes now, he would be way more willing to do it 10 years later...
So in fact your policy is that we should ensure Russia loses in Ukraine, up to and including a direct nuclear exchange. Why do you refuse to own the logical consequences of your rhetoric?
>Given they can no longer advance with their regular army, they launch nukes at EU... for any other fake reason.
Utterly ridiculous. This is unequivocally MAD territory. At worst you threaten MAD, you don't initiate a MAD scenario. This is the nonsense you dream up when you assume your adversary is totally irrational.
My take is that ensuring Russia loses decreases the risk of nuclear exchange. I don't know why you keep throwing in "up to nuclear exchange" in your argument as if it's somehow guaranteed. Russia has already threatened to use nukes. Where exactly is the line between them threatening and using that we shouldn't cross?
You presumptuously act as if know exactly where the fine line is. But lines are blurry. Maybe we're already past the point of no return. Maybe we've been there for the last 10 years.
> Utterly ridiculous. This is unequivocally MAD territory
Same has been said about Crimea annexation. And about eastern Ukraine annexation. And about current invasion. And yet it happens, and people like you are finding their ways to rationalize it.
I don't know if you realize it, but you are constantly echoing Russian propaganda.
Ukraine has been hitting territory that Russia either claims to own (Crimea) or actually owns (Belgorod) since the start of the war and nothing happened.
This should be the clearest message to everyone that all this nuclear talk from Russia is just posturing.
They had every chance to justify this months ago and they didn’t.
Obviously nothing is guaranteed, it's all a matter of probabilities/credences. But this is exactly why you can't make decisions based on the average/expected outcome and leave it at that. The utility of a nuclear exchange is so massively negative that it rationally requires giving that scenario a wide berth, wider than a simple likelihood assessment would suggest. That you are only considering the expected response in your analysis and resist considering the worst-case just shows how inadequate and ill-considered your proposal is.
>Same has been said about Crimea annexation. And about eastern Ukraine annexation. And about current invasion.
You don't seem to know what MAD is at all.
>I don't know if you realize it, but you are constantly echoing Russian propaganda.
I care about truth. I couldn't care less who else says it or what "side" it helps.
Again, this is based on assumption that Russia will stop after Ukraine. Given their rhetoric and actions in the last two decades, I see no reasons to believe that.
They've been consistently instilling hatred towards the West in their citizens. Not towards Ukraine.
Read the recent Putin's annexation speech, Ukraine was barely mentioned. It was mostly about USA, colonization, collective West, anglo-saxons, cancel culture, double standards, gay-propaganda, satanism (!).
Do you really believe this will all go away once Russia is done with Ukraine?
Just stop repeating this same nonsense. Either engage with the argument I posted up thread, or don't respond.
Since you're being vague and condescending at the same time, I suspect you're not arguing in good faith.
If you truly want people to engage with your argument, be specific.
Well, yes, anything where Russia perceives that using a nuke would be a viable option is a failure of regional–at least–security, which is why there has been substantial effort to make it very clear that that option is not viable for them, both through messaging, deployment of forces, etc.
Of course, should Russia use a nuke and that become a fait accompli, the same remains true going forward, which, to the point upthread, is why there must in that case be a substantial (though not necessarily nuclear, in response to a tactical nuke) response from NATO. But, before that line is crossed, communicating that that is the case is also important to avoid getting there.
Beyond that, Russia reaching the point that there only viable option is to retreat and abandon their aggression is not only a success scenario, it is the only success scenario. Everything else is some degree of failure. (Going forward, of course: retrospectively, allowing Russia to think that aggression was a viable path forward in the first place was itself a failure, but that’s the past and irreversible at this point.)
Yes, that is the intent. The problem is one of ensuring the message results in our desired belief-state in Putin. In reality, all we can do is be clear regarding our responses to various scenarios, and Putin will decide how he evaluates the cost of the west's responses. Putin may not evaluate the cost landscape in the manner we hope. Thus our actions may only precipitate further escalations from both sides.
>is why there must in that case be a substantial (though not necessarily nuclear, in response to a tactical nuke) response from NATO.
Why think this action itself does not start us on the road that inevitably leads to a nuclear exchange?
>Beyond that, Russia reaching the point that there only viable option is to retreat and abandon their aggression is not only a success scenario, it is the only success scenario. Everything else is some degree of failure.
This just goes to the point I made upthread, whether the U.S. can come to accept a world order not entirely driven by U.S. interests without fighting a world war over it. The era of universal success for the U.S. on the world stage is over.
No, it wouldn’t. A substantial NATO conventional response would be more sensible.
All in all, it's dangerous to let a deranged enemy think that the consequences for the use of nuclear weapons might be anything less than a nuclear response - allows them to think that it's a game of calculus that can be turned in their favor.
Using one of their nukes to take out a single himars is just dumb, even by Russian standards. They could burn through their stock pile in Ukraine, and still not achieve much tactical progress.
The response to using nukes on civilians probably starts with cruise missiles on Russian military targets. An escalation which Russia would eventually lose with certainty, and a final end to the "Russian Federation". This is not desirable to their leadership at all.
And let's say we do strike back with cruise missiles - it's unlikely to trigger Putin being overthrown. In fact, it may even convince some people on the fence that it really has been a war with the US for the survival of Russia all along. He has to retaliate so as not to appear weak, how can he reach an American target, even just an overseas base? I'm honestly not sure.
The scenario where his nuke draws one in return is just as messy with the out that it's so utterly shocking that it forces both sides to confront the fact that no one wants a nuclear war.
I really think China holds all the cards here - if they seriously threatened to cut Russia off over nukes, I don't think any get dropped. If they make wishy washy statements, there's a real chance they do.