How Carrier IQ was wrongly accused of keylogging
news.cnet.com
news.cnet.com
What seems more likely is that they were able to feed the reporter enough material from their side of the story that the reporter used mostly that to meet his deadline. Of course, the reporter may write a story from the opposite perspective Monday.
You probably don't even need a step 2.
...except the 17 minute Youtube Video that showed Carrier IQ capturing, and recording keystrokes.
lol. What "totally harmless software" or "normal things" require userland software to monitor every keystroke. And not just monitor them, but echo them so that they appear in the logcat?
The logging, likewise could be just some debug code accidentally left in.
Those were for a diagnostic command sequence or debug code too?
It's possible that they are monitoring the key presses of the virtual keyboard, but I have seen no evidence of that. From what I can see, they're recording the same kind of information that, say, Chrome or Firefox record for crash reports.
>Why you would monitor the physical key presses seems obvious to me: in the case of a phone or application crash, you want to know which keys were pressed at the time.
What good is that really going to do to diagnose a crash when 90+% of interaction with the UI is with soft controls?
Does the software log physical keyboard presses (that is, the letters, not navigation buttons)? It should be easy to test. (I'm not saying you should, but if people are this concerned, then that should be the kind of information we have.)
I'm not defending them, many of their practices are loathsome, but crucify them for what they've actually done.
Of course that information can be accumulated much more painfully by driving around in a van to pick up this information. And the quality will be both better and worse, better in the sense that a signal-quality-van could have equipment to evaluate the signal strength very accurately, but worse in that you wouldn't get the time of day and conditional variation from weather.
The 'attractive nuisance' aspect of it however comes into play when you've created a logging/monitoring platform and now you can collect other kinds of information. Like warrantless wiretappers who are unable to restrain themselves from listening in on conversations they have no reason to listen to, once the infrastructure is there the humans in the loop seem unable to prevent themselves from succumbing to their desire to 'know.'
I had a long discussion with some law enforcement types at a security conference along these lines (I was advocating outright bans on some of the tools they consider 'essential' for fighting crime). The economic cost of not using the tools is higher (higher taxes (to pay for more cops), higher phone bills (to pay for signal strength vans)) and, until it is actualized, only a "potential" risk of abuse. That is such a terribly hard equation for people to evaluate on instinct.
If the article made this point it might have some credibility. As it is, it simply looks like Carrier IQ's PR department working overtime.
Further, the keyboard doesn't magically work differently when it's entering text into one page other the other... not sure what track you're thinking on there.
Here is a pretty good quotation from their director of marketing: ""We're as surprised as anybody to see all that information flowing," Andrew Coward, Carrier IQ's director of marketing, told CNNMoney in an interview. "It raises a lot of questions for the industry -- and not [only] for Carrier IQ.""
They really don't want to shoulder these oncoming class actions alone.
That people jumped to conclusions that it was transmitting keystrokes, when "no no no, it merely has that potential, you see!" well, what do you expect?
My wire had some billing/technical issues and we worked through AT&T's data transmission logs, there were unexplainable uploads that seemed like telemetry or some kind of debugging. They denied it and told us it was our data uploads.
Now I know what that probably was ;)
Open up the tele-comm industry, this is really scare stuff!
Is that true for https?
But hey, he's a political science writer so he clearly knows more about all this than any of us.
But things like that might be illegal, and expensive.
Kindle Fire is a different kettle of fish and is almost certainly not used by most ISPs.
This should* not be the case with smartphones however, particularly when connected to wifi and not even transferring data via the carrier.
*The carrier may have planted an SSL trusted CA cert on your phone before giving it to you.
Tracking all URLs is half as bad as tracking keys.
And forgive me if I don't find claims that it doesn't record the keystroke data that it's sent anyway in a customizable app very reassuring.
www.facebook.com
... and ...
www.facebook.com/rebecca.some.name
"1-555-123-4567" "Rebecca S. Name" "facebook.com" "123 Fake St, Springfield Ohiyamaude" "Visa XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX"
?
Wouldn't they be able to put 2 and 2 (and 2 and 2 and 2 and 2) together to know who the traffic is coming from anyway?
There are plenty of youtube videos that you might not want everyone to know you are watching, political videos, religious videos, how to do crossdressing, etc.
There are no hard-and-fast rules about it (the web wasn't designed for privacy or security), but often web servers are configured to not log query string parameters for this reason.
That aside, wasn't the claim that Carrier IQ can also log stuff that isn't going through the carrier's network (e.g., when you're using your WiFi connection)?
Carriers are logging both your SMS and phone call activity anyway. You get a copy of the log in every bill.
"Any ISP" for me does not include my carrier, T-Mobile. That is, why should TMo know anything about what I'm doing when I'm using my home wifi?
More and more tech sites now are turning into these media engines that just want pageviews, their spinning a small story with very little facts into a Fox type news story, it's very sad to see, and will continue to happen, so they can be bought by the AOLs of the world.
The Russian hack never happened http://www.tgdaily.com/security-features/59984-the-russian-h...
This story has some very interesting reality under it and the details are still being uncovered.
Stage 1. Denial
(1) not allow keypress events to be sent to their software;
(2) force carriers to not hide their executable and show users what information they are collecting on their phones;
(3) keep a record of information, again to be shown to users on demand from the program installed on their phones, that has been uploaded;
(4) manage to answer simple questions, like (i) could you forward keystrokes, sms, ssh passwords, ssl passwords, etc, (ii) can your software contact your servers and download new control instructions, (iii) has this ever happened, (iv) under what circumstances would it happen
(5) easily give users the ability to shut down the flow of information and remove the program, including in all future updates
Really, this isn't rocket science.
(7) not include "user interaction" and "key presses" within the core claims of their technology patent http://www.faqs.org/patents/app/20110106942
..just might be construed as intent regardless of evidence.