And if no one crashes, you don't need airbags.
If I'm being blunt, reality doesn't give a shit what you think. It's better to design with the assumption there are bugs so that _WHEN_ it happens, the users are up a creek without a paddle.
These sorts of implicit assumptions are how painful software is made.
Not sure what's up with the CS people and their halting problem. In the industry we've solved (as in developed ways to deal with) the problem of verification decades ago.
Also, debuggers. Nobody said the verification can't be done by a human.
What you mean is "no known bugs", so may be use those words instead. "verification of correctness" has a specific meaning in our industry.
yeah yeah, I get it, those stupid CS people and their P=NP talk. Don't they know you can obviously verify correctness without verifying it for all possible inputs? What next, you can't prove a negative such as absence of bugs?!?
No, producing a program that can verify that all correct programs are correct implies solving the halting problem.
Verifying a particular piece of software is correct just implies you've proved that one piece correct. (And probably wasted your time dicking around with it only to find that the actual issue was in software you treated as 'outside' of the software you were verifying...)
What you're claiming here is that if you check enough inputs you've proven it correct, and what I'm telling you is that's not the case.
The fact is, nothing has been proven, the wording on the webpage itself is more honest (no known bugs and a suite of automated tests).
To verify a program is correct is a much stronger claim than what is even on the website. And that requires restricting the input or solving the halting problem.