If you can do it, show me. But I know you can't
I've been out of the cracking scene for over a decade now, but I expect that to be none other than a challenge, having seen how far publicly available decompilers have progressed.
I've been out of the cracking scene for over a decade now, but I expect that to be none other than a challenge, having seen how far publicly available decompilers have progressed.
https://nn-512.com/browse/DenseNet121
Even if you had the C code available to you, you would have a hard time producing the input graph.
Good luck reverse engineering it after GCC has compiled it!
NN-512 has an incredibly flexible code generator. It can easily be tweaked to produce completely different code for the same convolution, so everyone can apply their own twist to defeat the reverse engineers ("the intellectual property thieves").
https://blog.quarkslab.com/resources/2013-10-17_imessage-pri...
You just don't need to is the thing (if you are in a position to not care about copyright law; I did care, sadly): you can almost always just lift the code--with all its obfuscation intact--and run it in isolation on your input, which more directly undermines the entire premise of the technique.
Well, the obfustication is still pretty good if it's 9 years ahead of attacks.
I feel like this is a terrible mischaracterization of PRISM, even if it is almost true. The NSA deployed hardware (following demand letters) to service providers and collected large swaths of traffic based on various types of keyword and attribute matches. This was then put in a big searchable database.
(Remember they both said explicitly said they never cooperated, and it's illegal for companies to lie to you, or for the government to make them lie to you. If they were lying, you can sue them for securities fraud. They can refuse to answer questions, of course, which is the usual approach when they don't want to talk about something, but that's quite different from explicit denials.)
> But no NSA program ever involved secret cooperation from Apple or Google
This isn't true. PRISM collection involved demands to internet companies ordered by secret courts under section 702 of FISA. XKeyScore involved secret cooperation from telcos.
I invite you to review some of the documents curated by the Washington Post in response to the Snowden disclosures.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism...
Your argument seems like it's just parroting the DNI's factsheet, which is known to whitewash the programs involved (and is even more charitable to the program than the DNI's own factsheet).
I'm less familiar with shielding data like this, but historically things like VMProtect and Themida were the standard for shielding programs. These offer a degree of resistance to automation, but a determined human will eventually figure them out, and then automation usually follows anyway. Syntia did this for VMProtect and Themida: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurit....
Edit: A quick search points to Widevine continuing to have issues. Two more recent write-ups:
1. https://i.blackhat.com/asia-21/Thursday-Handouts/as-21-Zhao-...
No one in the West will publicly mention touching them, for good reason. In China they're everywhere.
E: not just China, but it's easier to find them there