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> Using NDA GmbH as a front company, Orekhov and Kuzurgasheva sourced and purchased sensitive military and dual-use technologies from U.S. manufacturers, including advanced semiconductors and microprocessors used in fighter aircraft, missile systems, smart munitions, radar, satellites, and other space-based military applications. These items were shipped to Russian end users, including sanctioned companies controlled by Telegin and Tulyakov that serviced Russia’s military. Some of the types of electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine. As alleged, in 2019, Orekhov travelled to the United States to source parts used in the Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft.

So what components are those, exactly?

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"According to court documents, beginning in 2018, Eriks Mamonovs, 33, and Vadims Ananics, 46, both citizens of Latvia who operated CNC Weld, a Latvia-based corporation, conspired with Stanislav Romanyuk, 37, a citizen of Ukraine and resident of Estonia who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OU, and others, including Janis Uzbalis, 46, of Latvia and individuals in Russia and a Russia-based company, to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia." -- Emphasis mine

N.b. not your average drill grinding jig.

It is WWII era technology. Something capable of making existing holes slightly larger, and far more precise in their placement and size.

You can find them used on Ebay for $5000 or so.

I'm assuming we're talking about a precision CNC machine tool and not a hunk of WWII-era cast iron with thou scales.

These machines were perfected in the '60s and '70s. They are not only exceptional for their ability to make a hole perfectly located and perfectly sized, but also for making it perfectly round.

Their ways being perfectly straight and perpendicular, and metallurgically stable, they are often bought just as a platform for converting into special tooling (for making air bearings, diffraction gratings, metrology and semiconductor equipment, and so on).

No, no, it clearly must be a WWII relic. That’s clearly why they would arrest these people. The guy on HN that has private knowledge about the indictment said you could find the same ones on ebay for $5k.

Nukes are also WWII era technology, yet you would face some very critical questions if you tried to build one in your back yard. So are rocket engines and jet engines for that matter.

This type of jig grinder is absolutely not comparable to the things you can find on Ebay, let alone for 5k.

Also, if they were model rocketry or ham radio enthusiasts who took things way, way, way too far they're still in trouble for all the oil smuggling and money laundering they did.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/european-nationals-and-en... specifically mentions a high-resolution jig.

I wouldn't be surprised if in some cases just the tooling bits are around $5000, leaving aside the whole machine. For high-resolution machining, e.g. for lens fabrication, there's a whole science to drill bits, where special processes allow for achieving up to sub-nanometer surface roughness in parts. If they're making holes in hard metals they might be using titanium, diamond, or carbide drill bits that have crazy physical properties and cost a pretty penny.

In some sense CNC machining is also a WWII era technology, but CNC machines from that era couldn't touch what modern-day machines can do and the repeatable precision with which they can do them: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnIvhlKT7SY

While on the subject, this really is a fascinating field and it rules the world more than people might think. Consider that TSMC's core machines are made by ASML. Among the most important and specialized-IP parts in ASML machines are the huge lens which are made by Zeiss. Zeiss makes the lens with some next level machining equipment from companies around Heidelberg and Karlsruhe area. High-resolution machining isn't super known to the general public but it is so fascinating once you get to see the things they can pull off.

Yep. CNC machines of sufficient accuracy/precision are considered export-controlled munitions because they can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons components or nuclear fuel processing equipment, such as gas centrifuges).

Their sale/ownership are registered with the government. Some of them have GPS chipsets or are otherwise set up to detect when they're being moved, and stop functioning to some degree until they're recommissioned by the manufacturer - though this is also abused by manufacturers to force a company to have to pay to re-commission a machine if it is re-sold, even if it doesn't qualify under munitions rules.

Other things that are sometimes export-restricted include components that could be used in missiles like accelerometers, inertial navigation units and GPS chipsets if they're the sort that have sufficient accuracy or lack speed/acceleration/altitude lockouts.

> stop functioning to some degree until they're recommissioned by the manufacturer - though this is also abused by manufacturers to force a company to have to pay to re-commission a machine if it is re-sold

I imagine that moving a machine with a resolution in the realm of nanometers might affect it's performance if not done perfectly or jostled too much in transport (they have special postuments built for them in the place they will sit and are calibrated once settled in place). If I was a new owner of such a machine, I would order manufacturer checkout anyway.

I worked for a company that made nanometer precise stages and robotic hardware for the semiconductor, microscopy and metrology industries. We made stuff that was so precise that we had to pause our testing twice a day when the train would go by 1/4 of a mile away because we'd see the vibration in our tests.

The owner got a "special" deal from our machine tool supplier for a "open box" milling machine. It was normally a 500k 5 axis large volume milling machine with extremely high precision, at least that's what we were told.

After buying it, installing it, andd trying to use our laser interferometer on it we discovered it was not even close to its stated accuracy, and in fact wasn't even as accurate as a basic mill. It couldn't make parts that were worth a damn.

After a bunch of back and forth, it turns out that this specific mill was a trade show demo unit, it had been taken around the country and and setup in conference centers to show. Somewhere along the way it was also crashed (when you accidentally run an axis, or several, into things your not supposed to). They neglected to tell us any of this before we bought it.

The founder/owner of that company was a real piece of work - so I suspect this has more to do with karma than anything.

Dan Gelbart once demoed his workshop and mentioned some Moore jig grinder, where after calibration, loaders had to use aluminized insulating overalls like in metal foundries, because their radiated body heat would affect machine precision.

Wow, that's incredible!

> Yep. CNC machines of sufficient accuracy/precision are considered export-controlled munitions because they can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons components or nuclear fuel processing equipment, such as gas centrifuges).

Or things like submarine propellers:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toshiba%E2%80%93Kongsberg_scan...

https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/toshiba.h...

Or things like submarine propellers: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toshiba%E2%80%93Kongsberg_scan...

https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/toshiba.h...

Flir cameras too, their chips, lenses, etc.

The first NC machines were punch card driven and used to make stuff like propellers and rotors for turbines after WWII. The National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh has a Ferranti mill [1] on display that produced radar wave guides in the 50's along with an example of its output [2]. It must have been like alien tech at the time, but still not CNC and extremely rudimentary compared to the machining center in that video. Computer NC was born in the late 1950's.

1: https://www.nms.ac.uk/explore-our-collections/collection-sea...

2: https://www.nms.ac.uk/explore-our-collections/collection-sea...

So, two things. First, if you find a modern high-precision multiaxis CnC on Ebay for $5K, snap it up, you saved six $digits.

Second, dual-use tech is not about cost or sophistication. Did you know that Casio F91W watches get special attention from LEOs in many places? That isn't because a 1980s watch is super advanced. It is because they're popular bomb triggers.

And a bonus thing. When I see something happen in the world that seems absurd, there are two alternatives. Maybe it really is absurd; stupid things happen. But the other possibility is maybe I am ignorant of important details.

I personally learn a lot by entertaining the second option, even if it turns out the first was the case.

>> Some of the types of electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine. As alleged, in 2019, Orekhov travelled to the United States to source parts used in the Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft.

> "...to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia." -- Emphasis mine

Unless the world is far more bizarre than I ever imagined, I don't think a jig grinder is a "part used in" a fighter aircraft or the kind of thing that you'd find in "weapons platforms seized on the battlefield".

Specifically I was asking about the "electronic components" common to both the "Russian-made Sukhoi fighter aircraft and the American-made F-22 Raptor stealth fighter aircraft." I'm guessing they will either turn out to be very interesting or extraordinarily mundane.

A GPS chipset is extraordinarily mundane (there are billions if not tens of billions of them by now) until it's one that lacks altitude or speed lockouts, and is attached to a thousand pounds of high explosives (or ~10-20 kG of Spicy Metal) falling from the sky.

The indictment was sealed up until just a little bit ago, it should be on Recap soon. Here's some excerpts from that section:

> On or about May and June 2018, the defendant YURY OREKHOV attempted to procure radiation-hardened, space-grade Field Programmable Gate Arrays ("FPGA") from a California-based technology and semiconductor company ("U.S. Company 2"), an entity the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, for Network Technologies. FPGAs were integrated circuits used in a variety of weapons systems, including ballistic missiles and smart munitions, and were controlled by the DOC under ECCN 9A515.el, which required a license from the BIS to export to Russia for reasons of national security. On or about May 23, 2018, an NDA GmbH employee sent an email inquiring about purchasing 60 FPGAs for approximately 4.5 million Euros from a licensed distributor of U.S. Company 2, copying OREKHOV. In response, the distributor wrote, "[U.S. Company 2] will arrange for a detailed export check. This special military/space component is subject to the strictest security measures." An offer letter was attached to the email, listing NDA GmbH as the "deliver to" company but did not reference Network Technologies. OREKHOV immediately forwarded the email and offer letter to the defendant SERGEY TULYAKOV.

> In or about May 2019, the defendant YURY OREKHOV attempted to obtain radiation-hardened random-access memory ("MRAM") devices from a Petmsylvania electronics company ("U.S. Company 3") and radiation-hardened supervisory circuits from a California-based semiconductor company ("U.S. Company 4"), entities the identities of which are known to the Grand Jury, for the benefit of Abtronics. These MRAM devices and supervisory circuits had military applications, and the MRAM devices were controlled by the DOC under ECCN 9A515.e.2 ("'Spacecraft' and related commodities"), which required a license from the BIS to export to Russia for reasons of regional stability, as well as for missile technology, due to their potential use in ballistic and hypersonic missile systems.

> On or about May 2019, the defendant TIMOFEY TELEGIN sent the defendant YURY OREKHOV a message that he had "five interesting positions," that is, five items he was interested in, and listed two types of MRAM devices and three types of supervisory circuits from U.S. Company 3 and U.S. Company 4, respectively. TELEGIN instructed OREKHOV, "[Y]ou can procure the positions as is or you can procure different quantities of each position." OREKHOV asked TELEGIN to send the necessary details. On or about May 21, 2019, an NDA GmbH employee inquired with an electronics distributor about the same two MRAM devices and three types of supervisory circuits requested by TELEGIN.

> After the meeting, Individual 1 received several inquiries from the defendant SVETLANA KUZURGASHEVA requesting assistance in obtaining a variety of military-grade components typically used in fighter jets. In the first inquiry, occurring shortly after the meeting between defendant YURY OREKHOV and Individual 1, KUZURGASHEVA requested a quote for 18 tactical air navigation interrogators and 18 multi-mode receivers, both of which were reportedly used in the 2022 Russian SU-30SM2 fighter jets' upgraded navigation systems. In July 2019, KUZURGASHEVA again contacted Individual 1 and requested assistance in obtaining a radiation-hardened, militarygrade two-terminal temperature transducers manufactured by U.S. Company 2. Later, on or about September 19, 2019, KUZURGASHEVA contacted Individual 1 and asked for price quotes for two communications devices that the U.S. military uses to transmit Top Secret voice and data traffic. Both items were manufactured by a Florida-based technology company and defense contractor ("U.S. Company 6"), an entity the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, and both items were on the USML and controlled under the ITAR and other applicable regulations.

They weren't buying GPS modules - they were looking for high performance, high reliability components specifically for use in weapons systems.

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