Log4Shell – Through the scope of a reactive network telescope
blog.apnic.net
blog.apnic.net
While we can point to Log4j’s “message substitution” feature, there are infinite similar "features" in (whatever software) which can be exploited IF there is public network access in and out of (whatever software).
So I would argue the most significant underlying problem for exploits at this scale is public network access.
Yes, even if access in and out was limited to strongly authenticated and authorized users with least privileged access, we could still have insider attacks. But we would drastically reduce the attack surface and blast radius.
certainly it is our job to tighten up our software - but we are very vulnerable with the current model of the 'authenticate after connect' networking model (L3 access mainly by firewalls...with stronger auth only later at L7).
said the other way...imagine if the log4j attackers couldn't even get to my firewall unless they were already authorized to have access to the specific service they are trying to access.
Like if I set my user-agent to contain such a macro and connect to your public webserver. If you had webserver logging and log4j configured a certain way, then I'm running arbitrary code. Maybe I can't see the output right away, but it's running.