That doesn't protect against attacks from occurring, it only protects against future attacks from the same people who already attacked (assuming the same people don't create a new CA?).
And when Chrome and Mozilla distrusts a new CA, good luck on updating the certificate chains included in the operating systems of all the devices in the world, especially those that never update (old Android phones? IoT devices?).
> there's no way to revoke .COM
I think there is no need to revoke .COM because .COM can attack any domain within .COM anyway, even with/without DNSSEC and/or with/without CAs? Or what am I missing?
> I think there is no need to revoke .COM because .COM can attack any domain within .COM anyway, even with/without DNSSEC and/or with/without CAs? Or what am I missing?
The point is you don't build a system that assumes DNS is trustworthy, because it isn't.
But the current CA PKI system already assumes DNS is trustworthy, even much more than if you were using DNSSEC-protected DNS PKI system, since it is not only vulnerable to almost all the same attackers/attacks, but it is also vulnerable to many more attackers (since any CA can also do an attack at any time, regardless of any possible future consequences it may experience or not).
If they are caught — and CT has made that very likely, but hijinks like in Kazakhstan sidestep CT.
Why do you seem to always be talking like if DNSSEC is incompatible with other security technologies?
DNSSEC isn't incompatible with DoH either, but you also seem to be implying that we need to only use one or the other?
I'm not trying to be a jerk, I'm just saying, this thing you're talking about doesn't exist. Moreover: it's unlikely ever to exist. CT didn't get rolled out because the CA's wanted CT; I assume they actively detest it (other than LetsEncrypt). CT got rolled out because the browsers required it. The browsers have no leverage to make the DNS PKI do anything, because, once again, they can't revoke .COM.
With WebPKI we have multiple mutually-distrusting parties keeping each other in check. It has become a better system.
It's not more power, it's the same power it already has!
This too-big-to-fail monopolist you're talking about can already hijack your domain, regardless of whatever WebPKI does.
> CAs have been doing shady stuff before CT and there's no reason why they wouldn't resurrect MITM-for-cash business given DANE.
Sorry, but I don't follow. Given DANE, CAs wouldn't even exist.
Unless you're talking about the transition period, which would be strictly better than what we have now, because the not-yet-transitioned domains would use WebPKI like today, while the already-transitioned domains would use DANE which has superior guarantees.
I'm not talking about transition period. DANE makes TLD owners effectively a CAs. The technical details are different, but the role of root-trust-anchored private-key-holding ownership-attesting authority is the same. And unlike WebPKI CAs, browsers can't remove DNSSEC roots for abuse of trust.
DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up. This isn't just a technical problem of a protocol for securing packets. It's also a meta problem of ensuring the organizations involved behave in a trustworthy way, even when it would be profitable to cheat, even when NSA and other 3-letter agencies put pressure on them.
And then what? Like you said, browsers can't remove Verisign for abuse of trust, because Verisign isn't part of their roots of trust.
And they can't remove the certificate authority who issued the certificate because 1) the certificate authority is not at fault in that scenario, and 2) Verisign could just use another one to issue a new certificate.
Whatever answer you give here would apply to DANE as well.
> If DANE was used, they could do whatever they want
See above: they can already do whatever they want, so you wouldn't be leaning on them more than you are right now.
> DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up.
We already have a centralized system of trust, called the DNS system. It's just that currently it is still relatively insecure (DNSSEC is not widely deployed yet), so we have another fake security layer on top of it (the CA PKI system) which, because it's backed by Google and other organizations that people like so much, for some reason people trust that layer even though its security depends on the security of DNS and is actually even more flawed (since it has even more points of attack).
> DANE is setting up a centralized system ripe for monopolistic abuse, where there are no checks and no consequences for fucking up.
You can implement a CT-like system on top of it which would give you more transparency regarding what certificates are being used (where clients, rather than certificate authorities, would publish new certificate fingerprints to CT logs or even directly to some server managed by the domain owner).
But of course, the real issue is how to deal with Verisign if it starts hijacking domains, but this is already exactly the same problem we have today with the CA PKI system.
You have to understand how CT works before you (a) dismiss it, like someone else did upthread when they claimed CAs can just ignore CT, or (b) assume it trivially ports over to DNS.
[citation needed]
> It only works in the WebPKI because browsers are able to force CAs to participate, by distrusting CAs that don't include SCTs in their signed certificates.
So? In a DNS PKI system, browsers would already distrust ALL CAs. So by that argument, it's in a much better footing to begin with.
What's happening is that you're thinking that in a DNS PKI system, TLD operators like Verisign would be equivalent to certificate authorities.
Except that they wouldn't, because Verisign couldn't create rogue certificates for other TLDs like certificate authorities can. And even if Verisign could create rogue certificates for .COM domains, this is already something that they can do today with the WebPKI system in place, since they can hijack any .COM domain at any time.
And even if Verisign is caught hijacking a domain to create rogue certificates with the WebPKI system, the browsers can't do anything about it, because Verisign is not part of their roots of trust.
So basically, you wouldn't be any worse than today (because Verisign can still attack your domain, regardless) but you'd certainly be much better, because you wouldn't have to keep a database of certificate authorities from all over the world who can create certificates for any domain in the entire world.
Oh, by the way, we're talking about a database of fully-trusted authorities that even if they are caught in any wrongdoing, can never actually be distrusted (like you mention) in hundreds of millions of deployed systems out there who might take months or even years to update, or worse, who never update (Android devices, IoT devices, etc).
All you're saying at this point is that CT doesn't, in your opinion, matter. But now you're contradicting your own argument, which was, previously, that DNSSEC can easily copy CT to do DNS PKI transparency.
In fact, a certificate transparency-like system for DNS PKI would probably be a lot easier and more scalable to implement, as you'd need to store a log of at most 1 DNSKEY and/or DS records per TLD per day (as per their usual TTL), or much less actually, because those DNSKEYs don't actually change often, I believe.
You don't even need the TLDs' cooperation to do it, as those public keys are publicly available, unlike certificates issued by certificate authorities!
You'd then need a way to check that the keys match what you've got from the upstream DNS server. You could probably implement this at the DNS server and DNSSEC resolver level. You'd return an error if the keys that you've got aren't available in the log. You could discard old keys, so a locally-stored copy of the log would be really small and wouldn't keep growing indefinitely.
The point is, something like this would be doable and has nothing to do with all the other points I've been making which are a lot more important.
Well, that's the entire point of the log, isn't it? To make sure that everybody is seeing the same keys.
If the keys you got from the upstream link in the DNS chain doesn't match the one in the log, you reject them, because you are being spoofed.
> to design a transparency scheme for the DNS PKI, one that does not currently exist, which is deliberately different than Certificate Transparency > now that you've learned that Certificate Transparency won't work for DNSSEC
It wouldn't work exactly like it is, obviously, which is why I've been saying "CT-like" system, not the exact same CT incantation that exists right now which was explicitly designed for WebPKI, not a DNS PKI.
Your argument is like saying in the year 2002: "electric vehicles can't possibly work because gas stations are not designed for electric vehicles". Well, not exactly a sound argument you have there, now is it? :)
> You've vindicated my argument.
I highly doubt that :)
TLS itself is used for securing almost every network communication that goes over the Internet nowadays, including SMTP (and even DNS with DNS-over-TLS or DoH, ironically).
So how does Mozilla notice that a CA misissued a certificate for my SMTP server or my upstream DNS server? (Answer: it doesn't).
Specifically, what kind of attack would a TLD owner be able to perform on a domain that uses DANE that they wouldn't be able to perform if the domain weren't using DANE?