China's weapons acquisition cycle 5-6x faster than the United States
acquisitiontalk.com
acquisitiontalk.com
So the US has to procure just few enough Tomahawks to make sure the factories that can make them retain some semblance of manufacturing ability just in case. If you check the DoD budget, you'll see that every year we procure fewer Tomahawks for about the same money (which is a lot). That's because we don't pay for the missiles themselves, but for the ability to ramp up their production if the time comes to do that.
But then, how do you get healthy competition to drive down prices? Let's say you want to found a startup to make cruise missiles? Who are you going to sell to? The US is only buying about 100 per year, and thinking hard each year how to cut that number down. You can offer to sell the same 100 for 10 times less money, but they don't care about the missiles themselves. If they switch from their current supplier (Raytheon) to you, then Raytheon will shut down the plant (maybe plants?) that makes them. Can the US trust you that you can ramp up the production when the time comes? Maybe you can prove you can, but that does not happen that often. So we are stuck with whatever manufacturers we have, it's difficult to get new entrants.
What can be done? I don't know. What is China doing better? I don't know that either.
All I can see is the problem is not that easy.
To move fast, you have to be willing to break things. When you go "agile" in software, you write a lot of crap that has to be thrown away. Same with weapons development, if you want to go fast and try ideas then some of them will not work. Will Not Work. That is intolerable to the procurement organization, because spending money on something that does not work is also known as "corruption".
Risk / Reward has to be changed by society. A war will do that.
I am not saying China is better. I am not saying China is more efficient. I am not saying China is gonna exceed. I'm only stating the process about how China operates. Please stick to the topic if you really want to discuss about China's process. If you are China's shill u can ignore my posts.
China as a whole is not in lockdown, and has never been since early 2020. Particular neighborhoods or cities with particularly large (by Chinese standards, meaning tiny by outside standards) outbreaks are in lockdown. The vast majority of China is not under lockdown.
This is something which is very poorly understood outside China, partly because of sensationalist coverage in Western media. It's also partly because most people in the West don't speak Chinese and are generally unfamiliar with the country, and thus have very weak nonsense detection filters when it comes to news about China. That's why complete nonsense like the "social credit score" myth continues to circulate widely in the Western discourse about China.
Can US do that?
The US has been at war for like 90% of its history
I mean it sounds scary until you realize that a large part of our military spending is a jobs program and wealth redistribution platform. We're not serious about cost optimization because it's not a significant limitation at this point. Being behind the leader has its advantages, you let them do the hard work and you copy|steal it at a much lower cost. This does not mean you can easily become the leader without massively increasing your spending (and now having everyone steal your technology). Especially when you are both nuclear powers that are not going to directly attach each other without risk of annihilation.
Lose what is also a question that should be asked here. I assume ally nations like Taiwan would be the primary risks, though loss of other trading partners is a serious risk over time. As for prevention of these risks we're already funding pulling processing manufacturing back into the US, but again, this is going to be expensive. There is also nothing like a war where the stakes increase to spur innovation and decrease costs.
"As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking," he said. "It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are. As those curves keep going, it isn't going to matter how good our [operating plan] is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are — we're not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem."
One area where the U.S. still dominates is with its underseas capabilities — the U.S. submarine fleet, Richard said.
"Undersea capabilities is still the one ... maybe the only true asymmetric advantage we still have against our opponents," Richard said. "But unless we pick up the pace, in terms of getting our maintenance problems fixed, getting new construction going ... if we can't figure that out ... we are not going to put ourselves in a good position to maintain strategic deterrence and national defense."
[1] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/32...
As a different way to think about it, consider that the history of warfare is entirely dominated by strategic failures leading to symmetric attrition warfare. Historians do not classify asymmetric success as war, unless it comes at the culmination of symmetric attrition. We have an industry and a profession based on the study and execution of war, which, I suggest to you, is tautologically strategic failure. The Chinese have traditionally seen the bigger picture in their strategy of “unrestricted warfare”, and they seem to recognize that their struggle is not against a specific military power or system, but perhaps the emergent unstoppable power inherent in the lack of a system or strategy. It certainly was this way for us in our recent engagements, as it will be for the aggressors of today. And yet, I don’t see the adaptation. We grow the war in scope but lose the objective. There is too much in the Chinese and US system that secures its own existence through a war of attrition against itself. All great powers end up competing in the same race.
This is the media's job: if the US accepted 1M covid deaths, it can accept a similarly massive death toll in whichever military confrontation the US might want to embark on next.
> instead must partner in alliances
The numbers are different, but the same incentives apply to China. That's why they have also been putting a lot of effort into making friends (funding infrastructure efforts abroad, covid relief, belt and road, etc.)