The example I'm most familiar with is calculating utils in terms of the expected total human population of the galaxy, were we to achieve interstellar travel: it's not inconceivable that orders of magnitude more humans would be alive in the distant future than are alive now, which makes their combined future interest more important than the interests of any (or even all) living human beings. Consequently, we should divert money away from the welfare of people living today and towards efforts that maximize the likelihood of a galaxy filled with colonized planets.
If that sounds ridiculous, it's because it is.
I would understand it more if it was purely hedonic: at least I could then argue about whether the ends actually do justify the means! But instead it's this sort of unfalsifiable, "but what if" reasoning that's actively diverting money away from worthwhile causes.
Maybe someone more familiar with the EA movement can answer this: why has rule utilitarianism disappeared from EA rationales for behavior? That seems to me a very natural check on these otherwise extreme (long and short-term) leaps of reasoning.
Based on how you described it, I don't see what's ridiculous about it.
It can justify virtually any action. The future is unknowable, so we can spin a new yarn every time we want to justify a new ethical compromise.
The problem is you can't actually be certain those future lives will come to exist. One assuming they will, and being so confident in their assumption that they deprioritize the lives of the currently living based on it, is hubris, but only because it over-estimates one's powers of prognostication.
Another perspective to consider; the best way to help people in the future is to help people today. Solving the challenges of our time is an investment that will compound into the distant future. Speculating on what life could be like in a hundred or a thousand years, and tailoring your efforts to that imagined future, is much like creating a product without a customer in mind. If you end up with something useful, it's almost certainly on accident and not because your speculation was accurate.
>>That's like saying the principle behind 1 + 1 = 3
That's not sound in principle..
>>Another perspective to consider; the best way to help people in the future is to help people today.
That is an entirely valid, and I would argue probably correct, perspective yet it doesn't invalidate the principle that a greater number of future lives matter more than a fewer number of current lives. It may be that the best course of action for both future lives and current lives is to pursue the best interest of the currently living.
It sounds ridiculous to you because you framed it in an uncharitable way. Another way of saying "maximize the likelihood of a galaxy filled with colonized planets", so far as contemporary people are concerned, is "minimize the likelihood of civilizational collapse". Even a marginal reduction in the risk of nuclear war, for instance, would be a very good thing.
Nobody disagrees with this. But since you brought it up, I think it's worth asking: what precisely has the EA movement done to reduce, even marginally, the risk of a nuclear war?
Nothing that I'm aware of. In general I think that most of the current "longtermist" organizations are useless - but that doesn't mean they're incorrect.
I don’t belong to the EA movement, so maybe it just isn’t my place to say what should or shouldn’t be EA. But this kind of bootstrapping of classroom ethical dilemmas into actually diverting donated money away from human welfare efforts astounds me.
I agree that they're ineffective, but I don't see any evidence that the MIRI types are lying - they're trying to help, they think they're helping ... and they're mostly wrong. It happens.
> But this kind of bootstrapping of classroom ethical dilemmas into actually diverting donated money away from human welfare efforts astounds me.
Are you sure that's what's actually going on? Donations and especially effort are not fungible. The techy libertarian futurist types in the MIRI orbit, for instance, are so far as I can tell simply not as bothered by poverty as Singer et al. A world in which they're not worried about AI risk is not a world in which they give just as much to other causes; it's a world in which they give less.
https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/cause-areas/long-term-future...
https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/nuclear-security/
https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/carl-robichaud-fa...
A lot of the initial people in EA came from the world of rationality. Classic LessWrong had 3 main topics that were actively discussed - AI risk, Rationality, and EA. It also happened that cryptocurrency became known and somewhat popular among some LessWrong visitors.
We're probably talking like 1% of LessWrong visitors, mind you - but a few of those became crypto-millionaires.
So that's why a bunch of people, who were interested in both AI risk and EA, and now have millions, are infusing the EA movement with cash. Or at least, that's the story as I understand it.