Apparently, it's impossible to migrate to ssh and why the ** I need to care about security here?
Does not matter, you stated without nuance that telnet should no be used. So you told GP that they should trash their telnet-only devices.
Ok. Telnet is a protocol, it is not synonymous with TCP.
As for unencrypted traffic generally, I see no reason for fetishizing encryption. "Compute" is not synonymous with teh cloudz. Cloud tech is not synonymous with teh cloudz. It's trivial to put e.g. Nginx in front of something.
If you need encryption between 127.0.0.1 and 127.0.0.42 you clearly don't trust the hardware you're running on; I'm sure someone's got some clever way of hiding the private keys, but "clever" doesn't mean provably secure. Between containers... meh. Show me you thought about it and have a threat model.
Between datacenters... not so much. Do I care whether the connection is encrypted, or whether all traffic goes through a tunnel? I'd like to see a threat model. Is sigint included?
Even across the globe I might make an exception for a well-reasoned argument. That would almost certainly have to be data which was an observable: the time, a flow rate. Encryption is not the same as tamper-proof. Even unencrypted data might need defense against that. (Maybe secrecy is easier than nonrepudiability. Maybe.)
Secrecy is not identical to privacy. Security is not identical to either of those, and hypervigilance isn't the same as not needing to be concerned with something (these days security can be either of those). Observability might be more important than either secrecy or privacy depending on the application, and who is doing the observing.
A lot of it depends on where you demarc your rings of hell and how you defend things.
I send data in the clear sometimes and I'm ok with it. I also use a telnet client for decidedly "not telnet protocol" purposes related to diagnostics as well as observability.
And everyone who uses "telnet as a program for connecting to a server on any port and talking the protocol manually" forgot that telnet is a real protocol and this type of abuse only works if the telnet client is sufficiently dumb / doesn't negotiate parameters. There is a reason why netcat exists.
Just because some old and rudimentary telnetd or telnet client doesn't implement it doesn't mean it doesn't exist / isn't used.
But in many cases out in the real world we have to support frankly awful old equipment that only offers telnet (if you are lucky).
I don't think we will see the back of such things before 2030 either.
Regarding security, some would advocate that telnet, or whatever else, is secure at least as much as the network underlying it. So anyone who puts their "legacy" telnet apps on a VPC is fine, and has decades more to enjoy software that has already been running for decades.
Trusting the network for security was common in the previous century but standards have improved since then. For example, sending your password in clear text is no longer considered acceptable by mainstream security standards since it avoids the risk of passive network monitoring or accidental exposure.
> (of words, equipment, etc.) No longer in use; gone into disuse; disused or neglected (often in favour of something newer)
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/obsolete
Bringing that full circle, telnet used to be common but it has security issues (lack of encryption or integrity unless you tunnel over TLS, lack of modern authentication options, etc.) and so anywhere it’s still used we should be looking in to replacing it.
It just doesn't make sense to encrypt everything.