EIDAS 2.0 Sets a Dangerous Precedent for Web Security
eff.org
eff.org
Put these certificates into the store and mark the connection EIDAS-DE, etc instead of that stupid little lock that tells us nothing about which of thousands of CA scams with opaque shell company structures it is.
This would allow EU governments - such as Turkey - to easily man-in-the-middle people’s web connections to such services.
Now while Chrome can try and determine whether or not the certificate is valid for google.com, it would be harder to do for lesser known sites.
I can foresee yet another DNS record that informs what CAs should be expected to secure domains within a DNS zone.
Turkey is not an EU member state, and at this point membership is not looking likely for the next 15 or 20 years.
Hungary, on the other hand, is — but I am not sure Orbán would try such a stunt given what would follow.