Biological agents have are seemingly able to derive goals from both internal and external signals, and are able to use affordances (aka what is usable through their environment/body) to accomplish those goals. These affordances are not predefined and the space of possible usages for any given tool is practically infinite (a screwdriver can tighten a screw, or pry open a door [0]). Biological evolution also doesn't actually have goal persay, its more of "what works sticks". Whereas evolutionary/learning algorithms have a defined objective function.
The big differentiator seems to lie in the fact that biological agents are able to engage in a semiotic or meaning-making process where given an internal state and its affordances the agent is able to make movements that betters it's state in the future without explicitly being told.
[0] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2021.80628... (title: How Organisms Come to Know the World: Fundamental Limits on Artificial General Intelligence)
I wonder if Pearl thinks that RL replicates his do-calculus under the hood, or if that's an innovation we're missing.