The intersection of shadow stacks and CRIU
lwn.net
lwn.net
There is also DMTCP (https://github.com/dmtcp/dmtcp/) but this might have other problems for my use case.
My solution was to use a fork server instead, which works almost equally well. There are not really much downsides with this approach. And this is actually quite simple, and also quite cross-platform (except Windows).
Stack canaries can be bypassed if you can find a read vulnerability to disclose a stack canary or disclose the randomness used for generating the canary, or by finding a write vulnerability that permits rewriting the randomness source used for validating the canary. See https://www.s3.eurecom.fr/docs/ifip18_bierbaumer.pdf
Stack canaries and W^X are quite ubiquitous. The biggest exceptions are JIT'd code, I think, though some JIT engines do leverage one or both.
Shadow stacks in principle are more difficult to defeat--read disclosures alone wouldn't suffice--especially if they're hardware enforced like with Intel CET.
Sounds like enabling shaodw stacks by default will deal a deadly blow to stack buffer overflows.