That's answered in the SourceForge discussions linked from the CVE: if you assume the password manager to be only as secure as the user's configuration files, why don't you just skip the hassle and put your passwords in a csv?
But:
1. Ease of use is a security concern - if it's a pain in the ass to use a security measure, users won't.
2. There's also attacks that for whatever reason aren't able to achieve persistence, but are able to obtain files. Let's imagine a browser or scp or rsync or whatever exploit that tricks it into uploading unintended files. These cases will be blocked by KeePass but not by your .csv
3. Users want to sync their password database via untrusted means (e.g. cloud providers). This is easier when the database is itself encrypted. (This attack targets the application config, not the database config, which is a strange choice to sync).
What threats did you think keepass was defending against exactly?