What's more, browsers have no real influence with DNS registries. They can kill misbehaving CAs, and have done so, to some of the largest CAs. But they can't kill a DNS registry; they can't even move their own names off a registry they don't trust (customers are going to keep hitting Google.com no matter what Google says).
That's important because browser influence over CAs has drastically modernized the WebPKI, most notably by creating an append-only cryptographic ledger (CT) that tracks every certificate issuance. That system doesn't exist for DANE and will never exist for DANE, because the browser vendors can't force the issue.
That's not why browsers don't use DANE; they don't use DANE because it doesn't work (for instance: large numbers of middleboxes won't pass DANE queries). But it's the reason nobody should support DANE.
You don't have to like the WebPKI or support it (I respect it more than I like it). By all means propose alternatives. Just don't make those alternatives a DNS PKI.