There are humans and non-human animals who are arguably in a position where their intelligence doesn't meet whatever threshold we consider to be unique to modern humans, but are undoubtedly worthy of moral consideration. In my mind, what gives these beings moral worth isn't intelligence, rather it is biological phenomena that give rise to the shared experience of living. Passion, anger, love, sadness, and the capacity to experience suffering are all deeply organic, biological experiences shared by living things, and a hallmark of being worthy of some level of moral consideration.
> There's also a possible argument that while AGIs are intelligent, they are not truly sentient. They are p-zombies, NPCs, not truly feeling anything, just "simulating" feelings.
The state of having a "feeling", in my view, is something that is deeply connected to being a specific type of living, organic being. Without the biochemical processes that give rise to emotions, it's hard for me to conceive of something as "feeling" anything. Perhaps if an AGI was constructed by emulating the precise biochemical interactions in the brain we'd have something like The Problem of Other Minds here, but otherwise it would be hard for me to give moral consideration to an intelligence that is in my view devoid of feeling.