Why UEFI secure boot is difficult for Linux
mjg59.dreamwidth.org
mjg59.dreamwidth.org
Making secure boot meaningful on Linux would be a big project - you'd also have to sign most of the stuff in userland. But if it were done, it would be done by the distro, which could easily enough sign the kernel module in its VirtualBox package and whatever else users might want to load into the kernel. Since this would presumably be optional (there would be an alternate signed bootloader that loaded an unsigned kernel for developers and power users), the GPL3 would be satisfied; and the end result is a system that's significantly harder to attack. I don't know if that's worth the effort, considering the lack of actual malware for Linux, but as long as the key is installed along with the OS, it's hardly an impossibility.
$ pacman -Ql virtualbox-modules
virtualbox-modules /lib/
virtualbox-modules /lib/modules/
virtualbox-modules /lib/modules/extramodules-3.1-ARCH/
virtualbox-modules /lib/modules/extramodules-3.1-ARCH/vboxdrv.ko.gz
virtualbox-modules /lib/modules/extramodules-3.1-ARCH/vboxnetadp.ko.gz
virtualbox-modules /lib/modules/extramodules-3.1-ARCH/vboxnetflt.ko.gz
virtualbox-modules /lib/modules/extramodules-3.1-ARCH/vboxpci.ko.gz
Same for extra/nvidia, while extra/xf86-video-ati being quite up to snuff, so Catalyst drivers are in the AUR.Frankly, I have no interest in my computer being secure in this way (running only code signed by companies). UEFI might have a place in kiosks or shared computers in public libraries, but not for a computer I own and physically control.
A way to add/remove signing keys is necessary (think NSAKEY).
I don't understand. What does Microsoft have to do with GPLv3 requirements?
Seems to me that solves most of the problem, even for dual-booters.