SMSs have much higher trust factor. After all, we have spam filters on email, but not on SMS.
Precisely - relying on someone's email address, phone number, name or physical address is not a reliable authentication measure.
You can consider anycast to be something like spoofing - multiple hosts make you believe they have the same address. There's no way your ISP can verify they are.
There are valid use cases for that too of course - setting your presented id as the number of your company's reception, having a single number for incoming connections (or a group) but using multiple lines for calling out, etc.
You can probably ensure the account sending the traffic is closed since it's likely to break multiple local laws, but on the receiving side, there's nothing left to do.
Are you so keen to see a system remain with this insecurity just because you have a fundamental belief that perfect security isn't possible? Most if not all security is a case of shades of gray, and there's clearly a lot that could be improved here by the network.
It's not that I believe that perfect security isn't possible. I believe that this issue cannot be fixed in any reasonable way without redoing most of how the current system works. I did some telephony-related work and I don't see any way this kind of limitation can be put on top of our current networks (both regarding sms and phone number spoofing).
If the default was that users couldn't send from other services/devices, then that majority of users wouldn't be vulnerable to the spoofing, and those who opt-in to allow third-party sending would at least be aware somewhat of the implications.
Unless I misunderstand the underlying technology?
And there's still an issue of how to authorise the third parties. If some bank says multiple sources can use its number for sending messages, how do you identify them?
Still - it would take only a single provider ignoring this to break the whole scheme. It's a bit similar to spam really.