But an illiquid bank is not necessarily insolvent.
In this case, the bank is both illiquid and insolvent. In which case we should not blame the illiquid event because it is eventual as the bank was insolvent ever since the feds hiked rates.
But an illiquid bank is not necessarily insolvent.
In this case, the bank is both illiquid and insolvent. In which case we should not blame the illiquid event because it is eventual as the bank was insolvent ever since the feds hiked rates.
> the bank was insolvent long before that.
Well, not quite. Insolvency was achieved the moment of the bank run. Until then, the bank was fully solvent based on the value of its liquid assets, including stock, against whatever obligations they had at that point in time.
Once the bank run started, that's when withdrawals outpaced what they could fulfill through the sale of their liquid assets. Hence insolvency, and illiquidity very rapidly thereafter.
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edit:
> as the bank was insolvent ever since the feds hiked rates.
This is less "not quite" and more "not at all" as it misunderstands what insolvency is - the inability to pay debts at maturity.
What is the maturity of deposits?
That's also why CDs exist. Far easier for FIs to actually do something with the money when you lock up with them and drastically reduce the risk of you withdrawing it.
Edit: Fed source.
Are Ponzi schemes solvent until they collapse?
This is redefining insolvency based on the (legally sanctioned) accounting trickery of classifying assets as HTM.
You are assuming that the rates got hiked, and never again will fall.
Had the rates fallen in a year, then they would have no longer been insolvent. And could have recovered. Indeed once they got stuck, they would have had every incentive to hunker down and pray for that outcome.