Whoosh the goalposts are moving fast on this one.
What you are talking about is opportunity cost, not investment losses. If SVB could have held their bonds to maturity they would have gotten back every cent of the principal.
What you are talking about is opportunity cost, not investment losses. If SVB could have held their bonds to maturity they would have gotten back every cent of the principal.
Interest rates rising means products with a fixed rate yield are worth less today. That value isn't gotten back by waiting until maturity. The nominal value is retrieved, yes, but the money in the future is literally worth less.
SVB was very poorly run. We can see that easily now in retrospect.
We don't live in a magical world where deposits (aka liabilities) are exempt from inflation and the assets that back them are not.
If you owe someone $1000 you owe them one thousand dollars. Not the value or purchasing power of one thousand dollars -- literally one thousand things called dollars.
So if you take $1000 in deposits, you buy $1000 in bonds, you wait until the bonds mature, and then your depositor withdraws $1000, you will be fine no matter if that happens in one year or a hundred years, no matter what the rate of inflation is. Your assets and liabilities will cancel out.
If your depositor tries to get their $1000 back before the bonds mature, you are screwed. That is what happened to SVB. If all of SVB's bonds had been mature by last Friday it would have been fine. Pretty much every article in the financial press about this fiasco has made that point.
It is amazing to see people twist themselves up in knots about opportunity cost and inflation when this is so basic. If liquid assets equal liabilities in the literal number of dollars, you are even, you are solvent, and your depositors get their money back.
> A loan today would need to be at below market rate interest in order to match up with the value of the bonds held to maturity.
Well, it's a government loan, so they can do that if they want to.
However, it also proves that holding bonds to maturity is different from selling them at market rates. It demonstrates the distinction between solvency and liquidity. Every financial publication has made this point when discussing SVB in order to educate their readership about the problems of duration risk and explain how a bank with enough assets to cover liabilities can still fail.
Now, the nice thing is, the government has time to wait for the bonds to mature. So the government can take the bonds, pay off the depositors, and get the money back when the bonds mature. The government won't lose money if they do it right -- just like they didn't lose money with TARP in 2008.
Also, at some point the difference between opportunity cost and investment loss becomes rather semantic. In a liquid market, you should be able to sell and rebuy your positions every day, which you generally don't do of course, but it does mean that the decision not to sell is similar to the decision to buy: if you wouldn't buy under these circumstances, you should sell.
With these bonds, their low interest makes them less attractive than newer bonds with higher interest, so nobody will want to buy these lower interest bonds at face value when higher interest bonds are available. They'll only buy these at a discount that would make their profit comparable to those of higher interest bonds. So the value drops, so that's a loss.
Personally I've never seen the point in buying low-interest bonds. But then I'm not a banker.