The banks finally got out of collateral and holdings that had credit risk, but they neglected to remember that just because Treasuries have AAA credit doesn't mean they're safe from duration risk. And given how little the benefit had to have been to them amid the bottomed out interest rate environment, it's amazing that they'd have subjected themselves to this risk...because sure, 1.5% on a 10 year instead of .5% on a 6 month bill is 100 bps, but at the immense duration risk of rates that had to go up eventually? Bananas if you ask me. And then not to hedge this risk with derivatives, just makes you wonder if they actually thought they were invincible.
As for it not being Lehman, that may be true, but they DID have Lehman's CFO in their C-suite.
As for the aftermath, I'm immensely curious to see how the Fed hopes to both steepen the yield curve with higher rates while simultaneously artificially propping up long term treasury securities by allowing them to be used as collateral for short term repo at par. Guess we're just throwing out Time Value of Money altogether these days. The cure almost seems worse than the disease, but I suppose I'm just continuing to digest data like everyone else is at this point. Interesting times, that's for sure.