>Mainly because it's usually fine
It usually isn't. John Kay and Mervyn King wrote a good book on this issue. They talk about events in three categories. Deterministic predictions, say where is the earth in five years in the solar system, probabilistic predictions based on past data, i.e. how likely is it that the volcano will explode in the next five years, and the most important one which they call 'radically uncertain' events.
Complex human events are almost always in the last category. Using the language from the first or second class of events to make predictions about completely dynamic systems that are entirely dependent on human intervention that have no clear relationship to the past makes no sense. Using quantitative language in that case is actively misleading because it creates the impression you have any notion of the total space of possible events at all. "X has a 80% of going to war in Y years" is an example. What they really mean to say is "I believe it is likely that..", but that 80% number is completely made up.
Or as Frank Knight put it: “A measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.”