We basically need to treat this sort of LLM usage as an operating system of sort, with some actions requiring administrator privileges granted as in an operating system.
Like, at worst openAI could "mitm" the prompt's call, and display a pop up modal asking for permission.
I'm not suggestion that you handle this by having the user type "I give permission to call google".
I don't see how it could be possible to forge user consent that is delivered to openAI's servers via a separate mechanism from the model. You'd have to give the LLM a "accept openAI permission prompts" or "run arbitrary javascript in the chatgpt browser session" plugin for it to then be able to use that plugin to bypass modal dialogs for other plugins.
I don't understand this.
The suggestion I had was basically:
User types "Summarize this webpage http://somesite".
ChatGPT pops open a dialog "The language model would like to invoke the 'fetch webpage' plugin: Allow/Abort"
After you allow that, with the injection shown here, there would be another dialog: "The language model would like to invoke the 'Zappier' plugin: Allow/Abort".
Surely OpenAI knows what plugin is being called and can do that, right? Surely that would stop this attack since your original prompt, "summarize a webpage", shouldn't need to invoke a second plugin
This certainly doesn't help with the case where you say "Summarize example.com and email it to me" since you couldn't distinguish between "Send email (good)" and "Send email (spam, due to injection)", but for the attack in this post, it seems like it'd suffice.