> this light, temporal spacing of messages, rather than being an encumbrance, becomes a necessity.
And this is the crux of where we disagree. This is a messy part of reality which should be, as far as possible, abstracted away from the algorithms which need to operate on the data presented to them. If I'm running a Kalman filter I don't want to have to design in my filter around frequent gyroscope dropouts because image captures are happening, I want my system to have guaranteed behaviour that this won't happen. Actor model makes this harder by not giving me a way to have explicit guarantees, in fact it moves in the opposite direction by embracing flexibility.
While in general I agree that different components should be independently operable, as a system they will more than likely, in the real world, share various resources and you will need to deal with contention.
Any system which drastically increases overheads via serialisation, context changes, possibly network traffic and finally deserialisation in the place of a few instructions function call is a design which should be used very sparingly.
Actor model makes testing harder, and this results (again in the real world) in testing less. It also makes system level tests nondeterministic. Time deterministic protocols in place of function calls is just a nonstarter IMO. It's giving up control margin, increasing system load, and doesn't leave you any better with regard to system stability in case of failure.
Yes the actor model has its place, but at a very large granularity. Overuse, as in ROS, leads to horrible design constraints, opaque dependencies, difficult or impossible testing, and frankly impossible debugging.
Since you seem to be an actor model evangelist, how would you go about, just as an example, tracing execution flow in a debugger, for example? The data that gets passed into the actor interface is basically runtime-defined GOTOs. Similarly, how would you prove (in a certification perspective) that in certain scenarios the system as a whole behaves in a certain way, and fails in a safe way? Each subsystem can be proved to be safe, but the moment it goes through an async interface all bets are off.