.NZ was just the latest public failure. If multiple large registry operators employing people who wrote the DNS and DNSSEC rfcs have had failures then how can you expect regular mortals to get it right?
Transferring your domain and your old ISP had dnssec on but the new one knows nothing about it and didn't check ... Down you go.
Mess up the key signing key change over procedure while transferring to a competent DNSSEC provider ... down you go again (although hopefully for a shorter time).
We do best practice DNSSEC, using fancy HSMs to do so, but if my fancy, proprietary, badly documented Thales HSM dies and the next person with my job has trouble getting the new box configured... no changes to the zones until its fixed. Take long enough that the RRSIGs expire ... down YOU go again. If at that point they throw out the HSM and roll regular DNSSEC using Knot or something it will probably be at least 24 hours for the zone to work properly even with IANAs emergency procedures.
I'm paranoid so we have 3 identical HSMs and detailed restore procedures but there is zero guarantee that if I ever leave my replacement will get it right. You can't hire dnssec staff, they are impossible to find, you have to train on the job.
The basic idea is excellent but the implementation in the real world is horrible. If dnssec usage was wide spread we might reach some decent maturity with the tools and protocols, but I can't see that happening any time soon.