So a government could MITM you but they'd have to burn a CA to do it, whether you personally noticed the attack or not, so it's a very high cost attack
Now, of course at the moment this document is created, there's no way to be sure this claim is true. The logs are a distributed system.
Twenty four hours later, (the Maximum Merge Delay, this is a global policy decision) the log should, if you interrogate it, be able to show you a log entry matching the SCT, which traces to the agreed Merkle Tree head for that log. If it cannot, in principle that log has failed and must be distrusted. This happens (to one of the dozens of public logs, somewhere) a few times per year on average.
In principle, everybody who sees the log could agree that they see the same Merkle Tree head, thus the certificate really is logged. In practice the mechanisms to ensure this works, a Gossip protocol, do not exist and have never been deployed in practical use.
It's probably fine, but without ever completing the system as designed, it does have flaws.
It has been - the commercial instance of Cert Spotter gossips STHs with Chrome's SCT auditing infrastructure.
Edit: here's the gossip feed of STHs observed by Chrome's SCT auditing infrastructure: https://www.gstatic.com/ct/gossip/ct/v1/sth-pollination
And here's the gossip feed of STHs observed by Cert Spotter: https://certspotter.com/.well-known/ct/v1/sth-pollination
If a CA misissues a cert for something major, like Facebook or Google Mail, and Google or Mozilla find out, my current belief is that they'd be in for a world of hurt.
But if a CA misissued such a cert for a single specific target, without a CT SCT, neither Chrome nor Safari will report that (currently, CAs are explicitly allowed to issue non-CT-logged certs; the check on that is that Chrome and Safari won't honor that certificate --- a reason, by the way, to reconsider Firefox). If Google found out that you'd misissued a non-logged Google Mail certificate, you'd get nuked. But there's nothing currently in place to make Google find that out.
It's clear what tweaks to the system would need to occur to make this work that way it would "ideally" work, and the problems are mostly not technical; you'd just have Chrome (or Safari, or Firefox) report certs without SCTs in its default configuration. But that kind of surveillance isn't really a thing right now.
I've been cagey about this in past discussions because my understanding was that the Chrome team did do some of this kind of surveillance informally. And I believe they did --- but I'm told that stopped being a thing years ago. Now they just don't accept certs unless they're logged, and that's that.
It doesn't even need to be major. Misissuing for example.com and test.com were major factors in the distrust of Symantec and Certinomis, respectively.
> It's clear what tweaks to the system would need to occur to make this work that way it would "ideally" work, and the problems are mostly not technical; you'd just have Chrome (or Safari, or Firefox) report certs without SCTs in its default configuration.
This would require a pretty big paradigm shift which is hard to see happening. But as long as clients require SCTs (Firefox needs to hurry up already) this is not really necessary.
> I've been cagey about this in past discussions because my understanding was that the Chrome team did do some of this kind of surveillance informally. And I believe they did --- but I'm told that stopped being a thing years ago.
I'm pretty sure this has never been the case. I think at one point Chrome may have reported certificates for Google domains that were not issued by a Google CA, but this was unrelated to CT.
Or maybe you're thinking of the Googlebot, which logs the certificates it sees while crawling the web.
Chrome - https://chromestatus.com/feature/6244547273687040
Safari - https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT205280
Firefox doesn't support it yet though - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1281469
In essence, a cryptographic proof that the certificate was sent to CT providers needs to be enclosed along with the certificate. That can come via an OSCP staple, or a TLS extension.
More info - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Certif...
(How many client/embedded systems do fully recursive DNSSEC verification? Zero!)
Case in point: earlier this year a bunch of CT-enforcing Android apps were suddenly unable to establish any TLS connections because Google stopped publishing a JSON file which these apps should never have been consuming in the first place. There was plenty of warning that this would happen, but the author of the Android CT library was not on the ball, and app developers were not keeping their dependencies up-to-date: https://groups.google.com/g/certificate-transparency/c/38Lr9...
I hope this will get better with time and we will find a way to safely extend the benefits of CT to non-browser apps. I think we're more likely to find success with CT than with DNSSEC, but there is no free lunch.
https://www.ssl2buy.com/wiki/google-will-start-enforcing-cer...
In that context, reading the already mentioned Firefox bugzilla communication is even more interesting:
https://www.ssl2buy.com/wiki/google-will-start-enforcing-cer...
It seems Firefox implementing it or not doesn't change much, in this case, due to its low matket share.
Two simple things are missing to make any of this infrastructure useful at all:
- A system as easy as ACME for domain holders to revoke any certificate. A few months ago, Cloudflare started issuing certificates for domains where they're only dns hosts. They issued these certificates through the Google CA, without informing the domain owners. I only found out through a CT alert. The response when I contacted both Google and Cloudflare was a shrug and a runaround, and the certificates were never revoked.
- A monitoring system that will only alert me on new certificates in the CT logs that it can't find on my infrastructure. Alternatively, an external system that will alert me if it sees a new certificate for foo.example.org that it can't see being used at foo.example.org - the low number of false positives should still make it worth it.
ACME in fact supports this, and I expect at some point CAs will be required to support it.
In the meantime, I'm working on a tool that will take a certificate, identify the true issuer, look up the CA's problem reporting email address, and provide an email template with the right words to make the CA care. If the CA supports revocation over ACME the tool will take care of revocation automatically (although you'll still have to demonstrate control over the domain).
(Note however that your example is flawed because the certificate was actually authorized by virtue of making Cloudflare your DNS provider. If you don't like that, your recourse is to pick a different DNS provider which is more respectful of their customers.)
> A monitoring system that will only alert me on new certificates in the CT logs that it can't find on my infrastructure.
Commercial CT monitors, like Cert Spotter (my product) or Hardenize support integration with your certificate issuance infrastructure so you're only notified if the certificate is unknown. I only get CT alerts for my domains if I actually need to care.
The open source version of Cert Spotter can execute a script when it discovers a certificate, and I know of users that use this to cross-check against their inventory and only send an alert if the certificate is unknown.
If you use ACME to get a certificate from CA1, then you can use ACME to revoke the same certificate from CA1.
But if the cert was issued from CA2 (via ACME or otherwise), there is nothing you can do about it. And even if the 'rogue' cert was also issued from CA1 as well (but under a different account), unless you have the private there is nothing you can do to revoke it; only perhaps get a completely new cert that 'supersedes' it.
Once root programs require all CAs to support ACME, then all you need for automatic revocation is a mapping from CA to ACME directory URL (this could perhaps be disclosed through the CCADB).