The last one is a problem for a lot of use cases. Lots of sites have different domains (also for example when HBO max renamed to max).
Plaid also relies on entering bank passwords on neobank sites and is widely used.
Plaid also relies on entering bank passwords on neobank sites and is widely used.
This is an anti-pattern, and is not worth supporting in new tech that's supposed to be "secure first".
We already have tech for delegating authorization.
And for things like Plaid, I think banks are moving towards OAuth-style permissions, where you login to your bank and authorize the connection. Under the hood, Plaid or other app can connect to the bank with limited permissions using API authorization keys. It's a different problem, I think.
In principle the fancier systems with a user interface could add a feature where you can change the DNS names associated with a key it's storing. That sounds like a monumental pain in the backside, and of course the primary consequence would be it increases phishing because now your users can be tricked into allowing it - but sure, they could do that.
For simpler devices like a Yubico Security Key, there is no such interface, they aren't storing any keys so there's no way to make such an association. The keys are bound to the DNS name and are actually stored (encrypted) by the sites you're actually authenticating to. So without a matching DNS name they're intentionally just useless nonsense.
So if the website bundles its domain in the challenge, it can make sure that the client signed the challenge for itself, and the client can verify that it signs the challenge for the current domain.
So now, if the service's domain were to change, it would presumably be aware of it and incorporate it in the new challenge, which the client would sign, since it's browsing the correct domain, with the same private key used before.
Is this not how it works?
The Yubikey can act in HMAC challenge mode, though, but that's not the mode used on the web.
What's inside the cheapest authenticators isn't a private key, after all they present a unique random public key for every single enrolment, so that couldn't work if they held a single private key. Instead it's a symmetric key (e.g. AES-256). Lets see how that's done:
When you enrol at a site, the authenticator mints a completely random new public/private key pair (with Elliptic curve crypto it's really easy to pick random key pairs because with a few bit ops any random bits become a random key) and after signing the enrolment step, the authenticator encrypts its new private key using that secret symmetric key and the DNS name in an authenticated encryption mode and provides that encrypted value too.
The browser, with the authenticator's help, puts together the final enrolment document, with a signature and it includes that encrypted private key as a Unique Identifier. All the Unique Identifiers in the protocol are huge random looking numbers, so the encrypted key blends right in with that.
For a web site, you need to store the public key (obviously) and this unique unique identifier value. You have to do that for everybody, anyway, it's mandatory. You can't decrypt the identifier even if you were sure it's encrypted, you don't know the key, so all you can do is play it back when you want a user to authenticate.
When it's played back, the authenticator takes the web site's DNS name, plus its own secret key, and decrypts the identifier to get back its private key, which it can now use to sign authentication messages. Of course if the DNS name is wrong, the decryption fails, which is exactly the same thing as happens if you try to use the wrong authenticator, or you're being phished, or a dozen other things - the authentication can't succeed.
The credentials are scoped to a relying party, which must be equal to the domain or registrable domain suffix:
https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#scope
If this wasn't the case and it was old-school public-key verification, it would still be vulnerable to phishing, since the phishing site could just forward the challenges.
https://www.w3.org/TR/secure-payment-confirmation/ https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/1667
And considering how most banks are set up, we are talking about the user’s only set of credentials. Which have the user’s permissions.
Then there are all these fintech startups saying that they’re secure because they use Plaid to access all your financial life, all to provide you with centralised analytics or supposed financial advice.
Sure it’s probably (one can hope) more secure than every single one of them rolling out their own hacked together equivalent. But still.
Am I missing something?
I’m not sure how it even works with second factors (I’ve never looked).
https://support-my.plaid.com/hc/en-us/articles/9098915502999...
I don't know for sure how they do it, but it must just be a thousand custom forms and browser automations for each bank they support. And have to be updated whenever the bank updates.
IIRC Yodlee and Mint do (did?) about the same thing, for banks without a formal API.
My credit union doesn’t give a flying fuck about Plaid and it’s a constant cat and mouse game that amuses me to watch. My credit union doesn’t have a path to online banking without per-session MFA.
I think banks should be required to provide a user-opt-in OAuth API for read-only access, but not so that companies like Plaid can pilfer your data.
However Plaid has made in-roads at many large institutions, and now supports OAuth, or OAuth-like, access at all (nearly all?) major US financial institutions.
Plaid never liked working against banks, that just made everything worse for everybody involved.
> My credit union doesn’t have a path to online banking without per-session MFA. This obviously kills async products at Plaid, like continuous transaction data, but doesn't block sync products like Auth (account and routing data).
In fact, Plaid made a huge push to increase the amount of MFA encountered on their platform. When banks or credit unions didn't offer MFA, or didn't allow users to enforce MFA on every login, Plaid would attempt to force it through a variety of mechanisms to ensure a bad actor would encounter MFA on Plaid even if the bank would otherwise let them through their actual website.
They can definitely encrypt the credentials, they just also have to make it simple for their backend to decrypt it when they need access to your bank, which defeats a lot of the security there. (It's still better than just storing it in plaintext).
https://support-my.plaid.com/hc/en-us/articles/4410324401047...
> In other cases, when you link a financial institution to an app via Plaid, you provide your login credentials to us. We store those credentials and use them to collect the data to power the services you’ve chosen and, when requested, securely share it with the app you’re using and establish a secure connection that you control. We then help keep your data safe and private with best-in-class encryption protocols.
If authentication systems, like customers, think New Brand is just pointlessly confusing because it's different from Old Brand for no good reason, that undermines Big Boss's amazing strategy and makes it look like something a toddler would try, and that's not OK.
However the nice thing when you have players like Google is that their technical people have got license from above to say "Fuck off" on technical issues without somebody who doesn't know the first thing about it overruling them because their golf buddy asked them to. So you're not going to see a way to override this behaviour and thus allow phishing even though I'm sure HBO execs would think that's fine.
In terms of practical effect, what that means is that when they use WebAuthn outfits like HBO end up needing to keep login.old-brand.example working, even though supposedly old-brand.example was a completely different product and is now dead, because that's how users actually log into new-brand.example as they are in reality the exact same product.