But if you use a smart meter (which by definition is in the path of the load) to switch something on/off it should not break as long as the load is within the spec of the meter. If it is out of spec of the meter, see above.
On a electrical component level the switching element they are using is rated for a maximal temperature. If they continue switching when it is outside of that temperature, because they did not observe a cooldown phase or don't guard against overheating in any other way, it is totally on them. They are operating the switching element outside of the scope, and they should never do that, even if some input tells them to do so.
These devices are not built to be operated by the general public. Anyone who operates these devices knows to reduce the load first.
I don't see the sense in saying "these devices, built for a specific industry with specific, exacting specs, should instead have been built with different specs that were never meant to occur".
Everywhere in industry we train operators to know how to operate machinery that can be made to break itself, because it's cheaper to train the operator than to make the machine unable to break itself.
The remote sends a signal to the chip in the device, and that chip decides what to do, often ignoring the signal if it's currently busy or otherwise doesn't want to.
There is no force here. Even if it wants to turn off on request in case of dangerous external circumstances, it doesn't need to turn back on so easily and rapidly.
You're looking at a $500K farming tractor and complaining that it doesn't have collision avoidance.
Now, smart meter being able to shut power off is somewhat expected. But I would also expect it to be protected command.
Guess where you don't have that? When you accept inputs via radio. The least you could do then is rate limit the input, better even would be authentication. This doesn't even has to be misuse. It could just be some wonky device sending the "wrong" sequence of zeros and ones on the right frequency and boom.
Guarding against this kind of interference is totally the task of the manufacturer. Designing the device in such a way, that you cannot turn a load switch into a makeshift dimmer for a short moment as well.
Still, maybe they should have better security. Specially as there is radio interface.
Seriously? The device has no authentication. By the design, anyone within range is authorised.
And it wasn't "forced". There's no code execution here. It was sent commands, it accepted them.
And comparing it to industrial applications with trained workers is just absurd. This is not some hugely complicated industrial system. I really don't see how logic for designing heavy machinery for industrial applications can be uncritically applied to consumer devices. It's just a different space, with different requirements and it's much less complicated.
Citation?
How? This is a system for remotely opening a circuit. The user can’t reduce the load first. At best they can (likely with too much latency to be at all reliable) wait for the meter to report a small load.
How does it enforce that? Is it just based on signal strength?
> The intended user can switch off or unplug the load in person then operate the meter.
This is just the wrong way to think about it. The "intended user" is all nice, but what can an attacker do? That is how these problems need to be analysed.
If a technician were on site, they could physically remove the meter or open the main breaker.
1. Disconnect circuit 1 2. Connect circuit 2
Bypass step 1 by only sending 2 and bad things happen.