[1] http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-01
This is a rather poor solution. The longer term one is Certificate Transparency: http://www.links.org/?p=1219
2) is solved with HSTS [3]. You can contact me (@chromium.org) to be built in. There isn't a notability requirement.
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
3) The BEAST attack was tough to pull off and is fixed with Chrome, FF10 and IE.
http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html
4) Yep, cookies must be marked secure. HSTS can also fix this my eliminating the insecure requests. Even with secure cookies (but without HSTS), a MITM can also set the cookie. (i.e. to log you in to their account before you hit 'send' and then to log you back into yours before you notice the problem.)