Comforting!
End user set it up with tools that told ChatGPT -- If you need to open an issue, here's how: zzzzzzzzzz. Then he asked ChatGPT a question and was surprised that it did zzzzzzzzzzz and opened an issue without asking.
Said tools may want to clarify their instructions to ChatGPT-- that users will usually want to be consulted before taking these kinds of actions.
It does not mean “system will sometimes do things unexpectedly and against user’s intention but upon generous interpretation we might say the human offered their input at some point during the system’s operation.”
Sometimes the system design is insufficient (I implied above the plugin could be a little better).
I hate blaming the user instead of the system, but sometimes the user deserves the blame, too. Sometimes it really just is pilot error.
The logged behavior would surprise many totally sensible people, as you’re seeing in this comment thread.
What exactly was the user error? Are we to believe that if you authenticate a plug-in into your session you are okaying it to do any of its supported operations, even at wildly unexpected times, and this is considered “in the loop?”
Here, someone chose to run code and give it credentials. The code was designed, among other things, to let ChatGPT open issues. They were surprised when the code opened an issue on behalf of ChatGPT using the user's credential.
When you run code on a computer designed to do X and give it credentials sufficient to do X, you may expect that X may occur. This isn't really an AI issue.
Code hooked to a LLM that does durable actions in the real world should probably ask for human confirmation. It's probably a good practice of plugin developers to have some distinction similar to GET vs. POST.
Most code that would automatically open issues on GitHub should probably ask for human confirmation. There's some good use cases that shouldn't, including some with LLMs involved -- but asking is a sane default.
I remember being surprised when I ran a program and it sent a few hundred emails once.
Right, and until this happens these systems are not HITL. The argument provided as recently as a few months ago that these systems are safe because humans will always be in the loop is now clearly dismissible.
You're drawing the system line strangely and making the choice about "in the loop" strangely.
A human decided to hook it up to a plugin with their Github credentials and to allow it to do actions without pre-approval. A human was still in the loop because the human then didn't like what it did and disconnected it. It only did a single action, rather than the kinds of scripting mistakes that I've seen that can do hundreds, but it still wasn't a very sane default for that plugin.
Is my cruise control HITL? It does not ask for my pre-approval before speeding up or slowing down.
HITL doesn't mean that a human never has to intervene or is never surprised by what the system does. It just means that a human initiates actions and can exercise genuine oversight and control.
We decide how much safety scaffolding is necessary depending upon the potential scale of consequences, the quality of surrounding systems, and the evolving set of user expectations.
I'm not sure regulators should be enforcing guard-rail on these types of items-- or at least not yet.
We'll be seeing more of that.
Was curious if this was a case of 'I did the thing [but totally didn't]'