So a man in the middle could prevent updates from happening, and freshclam wouldn't even throw a warning?
So a man in the middle could prevent updates from happening, and freshclam wouldn't even throw a warning?
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Ex... - "DNSSEC can protect any data published in the DNS, including text records (TXT) and mail exchange records (MX)"
So when wikipedia says DNSSEC can protect, that's the permissive can. Like things can happen. But don't rely on it.
Just that their dnsquery() via freshclam daemon is not using val_res_query() when pulling in the version number, so it is unverified DNS querying going on … over there.
This mean, any TXT record can easily be spoofed via a simple transparent MitM packet munging.
https://dnssec-analyzer.verisignlabs.com/current.cvd.clamav....
When it's better to just delete and replace a comment.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36171696 - "Calling time on DNSSEC: The costs exceed the benefits"
An hour or two may be a huge difference in preventing a viral spread, but at least in my experience is it is tough to rely on DNS propagation below the hour line. Seems like an odd technical choice to me.
And yet it "works" and as the OP mentioned for a long time. Often we get so conditioned to a security response we forget that basic security often relies upon a "simple" and inexpensive solution. Using DNS in this way is a best effort scenario that offloads work to servers designed for this purpose and for an open source project so you use what you have.
Oh, and there is a failover to https if the record is over three hours old.
Digging into the code of freshclam, source of libfreshclam.c, dnsquery() function call, it is painfully evident that freshclam daemon does not do basic DNSSEC when performing res_query().
Instead, freshclam should be calling `val_res_query()`.
They are currently using ‘res_query()’.