Nevertheless falsification is surely the most coherent justification for scientific reasoning in the sense of "a philosophy professor has a gun to your head and demands that you justify your work as a method for approximating reality"?
You probably won't survive that encounter.
> I think that we shall have to get accustomed to the idea that we must not look upon science as a ‘body of knowledge’, but rather as a system of hypotheses; that is to say, as a system of guesses or anticipations which in principle cannot be justified, but with which we work as long as they stand up to tests, and of which we are never justified in saying that we know that they are ‘true’ or ‘more or less certain’ or even ‘probable’.
The most common realist arguments are probably variations on the "miracle argument": our scientific practices work, and the only plausible explanation is that they have at least some ability to find the truth.
Paying attention to falsification also performs the useful task of pushing hypotheses into saying something definitive.
Science is much more than falsification, of course: for one thing, a falsificationist stance does not generate hypotheses on its own.
I'm not suggesting that all of philosophy should adopt falsification as a principle (and much less that it should be ignored if it cannot): ethics, for example, is a field which I think is important beyond what is falsifiable.