And the idea that there's an "inner experience" which is the object of our knowledge is the premise of idealism.
The objects of our knowledge are the world, directly.
When I open my eyes and see a flower, I see a flower. I don't see my seeing of a flower; nor do I see my inner experience of a flower --- where indeed, is the eye which sees inner experiences? And which eye sees that one?
This premise is the dogma of scepticism. Weighed against everything else it comes out vastly improbable.
When I see a flower, the object of my seeing (and my knowing) is the flower. My knowledge consists in having the experience of the flower, as caused by the flower. Without much scientific knowledge I do not know, indeed, that I am having an experience of a flower.
This talk of "having experiences" is a post-theoretical description of an event which is much more primitive. A dog which sees a flower knows there's a flower in front of it. It knows basically nothing about what kind of experience its having.
The dog succeeds in being oriented to the world as it is; the dog succeeds in knowing. As do we.
Neither of us are oriented towards ourselves. We are not peering inside our heads. Such muddles are the religion of scepticism.