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In a country the physical size of Brazil, having trustworthy election results the day after an election is great.

And we need to go to a voting place to cast the votes - it's electronic, but not online.

I remember an example of some arcane software that was used "internally" by some local German office to just sum up the votes and generate some kind of result sheet for the local area.

It turned out, although it was air-gapped, it was susceptible to an attack against its update mechanism. Some white-hats showed it was possible to inject malicious code and change the results.

You never know. That's the essence of the problem.

The nodes that transmit the votes back to the central office are, indeed, much higher value targets than the voting machines. In any case, the voting machine data is preserved, both digitally and in printed form (this last one generated at the end of the voting, before the ballot is locked down for transport), so any discrepancies can be flagged by individuals and parties.

The printed summary is displayed publicly at the voting places and the data is encoded in an easy to copy QR code.

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